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Abstract 
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The University of Texas at Austin, 2014 
 
 
Supervisor: David B. Spence 
 
South Korea established a non-competitive natural gas market in order to have a 
stable and economical supply of natural gas. The allegation has been raised about the 
inefficiency of this non-competitive market structure, but reform attempts have failed 
because of protests. Proponents of this incumbent system argue that gas needs to be 
supplied by the public sector in a monopolized structure so as to have a stable supply of 
this essential good, natural gas, and to prevent market failures like exorbitant gas prices 
and a deficit in supply due to a natural monopoly. They also argue that the unified gas 
purchase endows purchasing power. However, the gas industry does not exactly meet the 
categorical characteristics of an essential good or a natural monopoly and the concept of 
purchasing power is hardly accepted. Moreover, according to agent theory and property 
theory, the current market and firms are likely to be inefficient; several events are proving 
this inefficiency to be true. However, people remain unsure about the necessity of gas 
market reform. Ironically, South Korea has a different policy and market approach to the 
oil market despite the similarity of these two fuels. The oil market in South Korea 
constitutes an effective competitive market via a liberalized market, and is supplying the 
fuel stably and economically, contrary to people’s expectations. This thesis contrasts 
different approaches in South Korea toward similar hydrocarbon fuels, oil and gas. The 
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competitiveness of the oil market is examined through statistics, Lerner index, analyzing 
of the profit trend in the market, and price comparison by countries. Results support the 
validity of South Korean gas market reform if the oil market is effectively competitive 
through liberalization. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite passions for green and renewable energy, a new wave of energy has 
come from an unexpected sector. As U.S. President Barack Obama declared that the 
U.S. has a 100-year supply of natural gas (Snyder & Klimasinska, 2012), the shale 
revolution, which is the extraction of natural gas from shale layer, an unconventional 
reserve, brought about a paradigm shift in energy dynamics. Natural gas is important 
because of its abundance, economics, and cleanness. Meanwhile, South Korea, a 
country with few indigenous hydrocarbon resources, has been vulnerable regarding 
energy security despite its impressive economic development. The country’s import 
dependence of this primary energy source is 96.4%; fossil fuels dominate the energy 
supply and gas comprises 16% of its energy mix (KEEI, 2012). Different from other 
areas benefitting from the recent low price of gas after shale revolution, this Far East 
country still pays the highest gas price. Because of weak market power and 
transportation restrictions due to the country’s isolated geographic location, South 
Korea has been left behind in this big change. The South Korean gas market is 
monopolized through all sectors; the gas import and transmission is monopolized by a 
state controlling enterprise (SCE), Korean Gas Corporation (KOGAS), and the final 
distribution and sales are monopolized locally by small local distribution companies 
(LDCs). Contrary to the general idea that competition makes for efficiency, this industry 
is non-competitive to prevent market failures like inefficient resource allocations in the 
infrastructure and excessively expensive prices. However, situational changes are 
casting doubts about if the current system is still efficient; requests for gas market 
reform are substantial. A bill allowing the private sector to import natural gas was 
proposed but failed to pass last year due to protests.  
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Given this situation, this thesis aims to verify if South Korea’s gas market 
reform is valid. In order to do this, I first provide overview of natural gas to understand 
why physical characteristics have constricted the transaction practice and influenced 
supply and demand. Next, I provide background knowledge about the current status of 
the South Korean gas market.  
Conflicting rationales exist with regard to the maintenance of the status quo for 
non-competitive market and reforms of the competitive market. The non-competitive 
market is appropriate for three reasons: when an item is essential to people’s lives and 
needs an universal service; if the industry has a high probability of a natural monopoly 
due to high capital investment as with the network industry; and if the unified import by 
a single monopoly company endows purchasing power to the company. However, the 
gas industry falls short of the qualification to be an essential good or a network industry. 
Rather, the public sector can be inefficient and purchasing power does not make sense 
considering the events showing the inefficient KOGAS transaction. 
The severe controversy required an empirical benchmark and many attempts 
have been made to compare South Korea’s market with those of foreign countries. 
However, this paper draws from another energy industry within South Korea’s borders. 
The oil industry in Korea provides a complementary baseline for comparison to the 
country’s gas industry. This thesis identifies the similarity of gas and oil, and proves 
that the oil market is effectively competitive through liberalization. Results assert that 
there is no reason to reject gas market reform. Consequently, this paper contrasts and 
examines the validity of arguments supporting reform and the maintenance of the status 
quo within the South Korean natural gas market. It also offers the case study of the oil 
industry in South Korea, an effectively competitive market due to liberalization, as 
supporting evidence of gas market reform.  
3 
 
2. Background 
This thesis discusses the matter of supplying natural gas (referred to hereafter as just 
“gas” sometimes) to South Korea (referred to hereafter as Korea for convenience). Before 
the discussion about the main topic, this chapter overviews the basic knowledge about 
Natural gas and provides a brief introduction to the Korean natural gas market.  
 
2.1 Overview of Natural Gas 
Natural gas is one of the main energy sources in modern society. Understanding the 
physical characteristics of natural gas is important because they influence on the fuel’s 
supply chain and market structure. The following sections will explain the various aspects 
of natural gas. Please note that this chapter provides information about commonly salable 
quality gas despite a variety of forms of natural gas, since this thesis is about the marketed 
natural gas as a fuel.    
2.1.1 Basic properties of natural gas (hydrocarbon)  
Natural gas is the group of the simplest and lightest form of organic hydrocarbons, 
which are compounds of hydrogen and carbon. This gas shows various combinations such 
as methane (CH4), ethane (C2H6), propane (C3H8), and butane (C4H10). The smaller its 
number of carbon molecules, the lighter it is. Additionally, it is more likely to be gaseous 
under the cold temperature and high pressure. Methane is the main component of the 
commercial natural gas; other light hydrocarbons, from ethane to butane, are called “natural 
gas liquids” (NGL). These light hydrocarbons that are gaseous at the temperature of 
20  under atmospheric pressure are categorized as natural gas according to a strict 
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definition. However, natural gas in real reservoirs includes a little portion of low density 
liquid hydrocarbons heavier than pentane (C5H12) so called “condensate.” Hydrocarbons 
heavier than hexadecane (C16H34) are categorized as petroleum when liquid, or coal when 
solid. This variance of the compositions comes from the temperature and pressure at the 
place where the hydrocarbons formed, which will be discussed later. Gas containing more 
than 95% methane is called “dry gas” or “lean gas”, and gas containing less than 95% of 
methane and more than 5% of other hydrocarbons is called “wet gas” or “rich gas”. When 
the gas contains a significant amount of NGL or condensate, it is better to sell the 
hydrocarbons separately because prices of the non-methane hydrocarbons are more 
expensive than that of pure methane. In a natural state, natural gas includes a significant 
amount of impurities like water, carbon dioxide (CO2), hydrogen sulfide (H2S), oxygen, 
nitrogen, and helium as well as heavier hydrocarbons, which are refined before they are 
marketed. Removal of these impurities is important in dealing with natural gas because CO2 
and H2S can corrode the pipelines and produce undesirable byproducts like sulfur oxide 
(SOX) and greenhouse gases (GHG). Gas with a high composition of H2S is called “sour 
gas”; gas with low composition is called “sweet gas”. Both sour and sweet types of gas 
need removal of H2S to prevent air pollution, though sweet gas is easier to refine. Other 
impurities like helium or argon are neither toxic nor corrosive, but they lower the energy 
density of gas. Thus, typical natural gas in the market is mainly methane with a small 
amount of other components.  
Heavier hydrocarbons have higher heating value, higher boiling point, higher 
viscosity, and more impurities than lighter hydrocarbons. Therefore, the light hydrocarbon 
like methane has relatively low energy; the heating value of natural gas is 35,400 – 42,800 
kilo Joule per square meter (kJ/m
2
).  However, natural gas emits lower levels of pollution 
than oil or coal, since heavier hydrocarbons are more likely to combust incompletely and 
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contain more impurities. Natural gas is odorless and lighter than the air. The boiling point 
of pure methane is -162 ; propane at -42 . These properties make natural gas difficult to 
store and transport; gas was abandoned or flared in the early stages of the oil and gas 
industry (Kidnay & Parrish, 2006). 
2.1.2 Gas Formation and Reserves 
Since natural gas is a kind of fossil fuel, the basic principal of its formation is 
similar to that of petroleum; but is unique regarding the temperature and pressure at the 
location where it formed. There are a few theories regarding the hydrocarbons origin, but 
the most accepted and applicable theory to the marketed hydrocarbons so far is the organic 
theory: the dead marine lives accumulated on the bottom of the ocean; these organic matters 
decayed and decomposed through the heat and pressure over an accumulation of millions of 
years, turning into kerogen, the precursor for hydrocarbons; the heat and pressure reaction 
called diagenesis, catagenesis, and metagenesis (distinguished by the level of temperature 
and pressure that causes the hydrogen/carbon ratio increase to transform the kerogen into 
hydrocarbon sources). As depth increases, more gas than oil forms; below 6,000 meters, 
only gas forms and at between 1,500 to 6,000 meters, oil and gas form together. (Coal and 
coal bed methane form when this process occurs in an onshore area with land-based living 
creatures.) The formation occurs first in a muddy sedimentary rock like shale, source rock, 
but increasing accumulations add more pressure and squeeze the droplets of hydrocarbon, 
forcing them to migrate upward to more porous layers like sandstone, reservoir rocks. They 
stop to migrate when they meet a capping impermeable layer, sealing rock. This reservoir 
can include gas only or oil only, but mostly have both of them. When a reservoir contains 
mainly petroleum, gas found in the reservoir is called “associated gas”; gas without oil is 
called “nonassociated gas”. This type of common reservoir comprised of source rock, 
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reservoir rock, and sealing rock is called a conventional resource. Unconventional sources 
refer to coal bed methane, gas hydrate, and gas at other difficult conditions with low 
permeability, like shale gas. These unconventional resources have been considered to be not 
feasible due to the technical and economic constraints in the past. However, technological 
advances like directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing finally enabled economically 
feasible natural gas extraction from the low permeable shale formation (Craig, Vaughan, & 
Skinner, 2011).  
                                                                                                            Unit: tcm 
 
Table 1: World proved natural gas reserves by country (drawn from BP data) 
The measurement of the existing gas amount varies based on the standard. The 
possible resource amount including all conventional and unconventional sources is 
enormous, but statistics agencies usually include only the “proved reserves”, which are 
considered to be extractable under the current economic and technical base. The current 
estimation of the proved reserve is 187.3 trillion cubic meter (tcm). Distribution of the 
reserves is sparse, similar to that of petroleum. Iran is the richest country with 33.6 tcm of 
Region tcm Region tcm
World Total 187.3
Middle East 80.5 North America 10.8
Iran 33.6 US 8.5
Qatar 25.1 Canada 2.0
Saudi Arabia 8.2 Mexico 0.3
UAE 6.1 Africa 14.5
Others 7.5 Algeria 4.5
Europe & Eurasia 58.4 Nigeria 5.2
Russian Federation 32.9 Others 4.8
Turkmenistan 17.5 Asia Pacific 15.5
Others 8 Australia 3.8
Central & South America 7.6 China 3.1
Venezuela 5.6 Indonesia 2.9
Others 2 Others 5.7
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natural gas followed by Russia with 32.9 tcm. Middle Eastern countries have 43% and the 
former USSR region has 29% of the world’s reserve. The world’s proved reserve amount 
has increased by 59% from 117.6 tcm in 1992, including unconventional resources into 
proved reserves (BP, 2013). This trend will continue, since many countries in South 
America and China have large unconventional gas resources. 
2.1.3 Supply Chain 
 The natural gas supply chain can be drilled down into three main stages: upstream, 
midstream, and downstream. Upstream usually refers to exploration and production 
activities; midstream means the refining and transformation of gas, and transportation 
activities by pipelines or vessels; downstream indicates the commercial activities 
distributing the gas to the end-users. However, in an economy without its own reserves, the 
importing activity is considered to be upstream since it is bringing gas into the economy; 
the intra transmission line is considered to be midstream; lastly the small local distribution 
is the downstream. This section will deal only with upstream and midstream; downstream 
will be discussed later in the market structure part, since its sector closely aligns with 
commercial activity.  
2.1.3.1 Upstream Sector 
Regarding the production activity, there are two ways to produce more 
hydrocarbons; one is to produce more from the existing well and the other is produce from 
wells that were previously not producible. First, we can produce hydrocarbon from 
conventional wells that have good porosity and permeability. Those wells used to be 
explored and produced by vertical drilling. At the early stage of production of a 
conventional well, the well’s natural pressure incurred by internal water drive, gas 
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expansion, and evolution of dissolved gases can push the fossil fuel out. 20-30% of 
petroleum or gas can be recovered with this natural pressure and this method is called 
“primary recovery.” When the natural pressure cannot push the hydrocarbons anymore, 
artificial pressure is introduced by inserting water, steam, or chemicals; this additional 
recovery is called “secondary recovery.” Naturally, the secondary recovery is expensive but 
the maximum rate of hydrocarbon production is known to be at most 50% after all these 
efforts. Thus, people want to find more reserves. Drilling deeper into the underground is a 
definite way to find and produce more hydrocarbons. Rotary drills can operate to the depth 
of more than 10,000 meters. The evolution of the offshore platforms has enabled the 
production at the depth of 3,000 meters under the ocean.  
 
 
Figure 1: Vertical drilling and horizontal drilling (Keystone Exploration, 2014) 
 However, the more dramatic technological breakthroughs were directional drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing. These advances enabled the production from unconventional wells 
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and increased the amount of proved reserves. After reaching a certain depth by the vertical 
drilling, the drilling is converted to horizontal and keeps changing the direction to dig the 
existing reserve efficiently. As a result, directional drilling can produce petroleum from a 
10 kilo meter (km) wide zone with one wellhead and reduced drilling sites and wells. This 
change reduced cost and enhanced productivity.  
Hydraulic fracturing also opened up the tight constricted pores by pumping down 
the water and coarse sand with high pressure and injecting strong acid chemical solutions 
into the impermeable layer, like shale (Craig, Vaughan, & Skinner, 2011). Hydraulic 
fracturing rendered an immediate commercial production increase in the U.S. Now the U.S. 
is competing with Russia as to which country is the largest natural gas producer.  
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of hydraulic fracturing (Keystone Exploration, 2014) 
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        The world’s natural gas production volume in 2012 was 3,364 billion cubic meter 
(bcm); the U.S. produced 681 bcm and Russia produced 592 bcm. The production rate is 
not exactly proportional to the reserve amount. A country like Norway produces more 
compared to its reserve amount, but a country like Venezuela produces less than its reserve 
amount (BP, 2013). The difference comes from the infrastructure and commercial 
production development varying by countries. Moreover, hydraulic fracturing has not been 
executed commercially outside the US so far, but the diffusion of the technology will likely 
lead to future changes in production volume. 
                                                                                                                     Unit: bcm 
 
Table 2: World natural gas production by country in 2012 (drawn from BP data) 
2.1.3.2 Midstream Sector: Pipelined Natural Gas 
Supplying natural gas is not just about production, since consuming areas and 
producing areas are different as other fossil fuels. Transportation plays an important role in 
Region bcm Region bcm
World Total 3363.9
Middle East 548.4 North America 896.4
Iran 160.5 US 681.4
Qatar 157.0 Canada 156.5
Saudi Arabia 102.8 Mexico 58.5
UAE 51.7 Africa 216.2
Others 76.4 Algeria 81.5
Europe & Eurasia 1035.4 Egypt 60.9
Russian Federation 592.3 Nigeria 43.2
Norway 114.9 Others 30.6
Turkmenistan 64.4 Asia Pacific 490.2
United Kingdom 41.0 China 107.2
Others 222.8 Indonesia 71.1
Central & South America 177.3 Australia 49.0
Trinidad & Tobago 42.2 Parkistan 41.5
Argentina 37.7 Thailand 41.4
Venezuela 32.8 India 40.2
Others 64.6 Others 139.8
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supplying natural gas because natural gas is trickier to transport--it is too light and bulky at 
the normal surface condition, excepting the NGLs sold separately to industrial users. 
Transportation costs, via onshore pipeline per one energy unit of natural gas, are three to 
five times higher than the energy equivalent amount of oil transportation. Intercontinental 
natural gas transportation via pipeline or liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker can cost about 
20 times more than that of oil transportation. The pipeline for long distance transportation is 
called the “transmission pipeline,” which is distinct from the small pipeline for the local 
distribution. The diameter of the transmission pipeline ranges from 16 to 48 inches and it is 
comprised mostly of steel and alloys. The point of primary importance in the pipeline 
operation is to maintain a proper pressure for gas to flow. The operation pressure in onshore 
pipeline networks ranges from 60 to 125 bar, and offshore pipelines need as high as 150 
bar. To endure the pressure, the high-quality steel pipelines are coated to prevent corrosion. 
When a pipeline is submerged in water, the cathodic protection method is used to protect 
corrosion by applying a direct current to offset the corrosion current. Moreover, to prevent 
the internal corrosion, various measures are employed, including dewatering, inhibition, 
cleaning (pigging), and using internal pipeline coatings. To maintain the pressure of the gas 
flow during the transportation, periodical compression is required. Thus, compression 
stations are located at every 40 to 100 mile intervals. Metering stations monitor any loss of 
gas and the flow is controlled by numerous valves in cases of maintenance or an event 
necessitating the closure of some parts of pipelines (Chandra, 2006).  
The construction cost of pipeline is roughly estimated by the unique unit of inch-
mile, which means the average cost per combined unit of each inch in diameter and each 
mile in length. The construction cost of pipelines increased from around $30,000 per inch-
mile in 1993 to $100,000 per inch-mile in 2008. Despite the technological advances, the 
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rising steel price has impacted the cost, since this material cost comprises about 35% of the 
total cost (Tubb, 2009).  
                                                                            (Unit: $1,000 per inch-mile) 
 
Figure 3: Natural gas pipeline construction costs (Tubb, 2009) 
2.1.3.3 Midstream Sector: Liquefied Natural Gas 
In onshore natural gas transportation, pipeline networks are absolutely 
advantageous, but in offshore transportation, the LNG can be a good alternative. Because of 
the proportional cost of pipeline construction and the surging cost in the case of submarine 
pipelines, there is a break-even point at the distance of 3,000 km between pipeline 
transportation and LNG tanker transportation; for distances longer than 3,000 km, LNG is 
more favorable than pipelines, as shown in figure 2 (Schwimmbeck, 2008). Therefore, 31 
percent of total natural gas production is traded internationally, and about 29 percent of the 
international trade amount is transported in the LNG form (IEA, 2013). 
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Figure 4: Transportation costs for natural gas via pipeline and as LNG as a function of 
the capacity (Schwimmbeck, 2008) 
The LNG value chain is composed of three main parts: liquefaction, marine tanker, 
and regasification. Natural gas is liquefied at -162  and its volume contracts to 1/600 times 
when liquefied. In order to acquire this freezing temperature, an expensive refrigerating 
facility is required. The principal of natural gas liquefaction is the same as the refrigeration 
cycle used in an air conditioner or a refrigerator. However, the real application in a natural 
gas liquefaction plant is complex and its size is gigantic. The main factors that characterize 
the plant are refrigerant and the numbers of cycles. Natural gas cools down via the heat 
exchanges with the refrigerant. The refrigerant, once heated, is pressurized by compressors 
and cooled down by air or cooling water; then achieves the freezing temperature required 
for liquefaction by depressurizing. The efficiency of this cycle, which is the ratio between 
the output of the LNG and input energy of the feed gas, is measured by the proximity of the 
cooling curves of the refrigerant and the feed gas. The gap between the two curves is related 
to energy consumed by the compressors. Different kinds of refrigerants and different 
14 
 
numbers of cycles can create infinite combinations, but only a few combinations are 
actually applied in real projects. The companies specialized in process designs have 
proprietary rights on their development. In a pre-cooled cycle system, mixed refrigerant is 
preferred, although a pure component refrigerant can be used in the pre-cooling stage. In a 
cascade system, pure refrigerants are used for each exchanger; the refrigerant ingredient is 
different at each level. The former combination is called a mixed component pre-cooled 
refrigeration (MPR) and the latter is called a pure component cascade (PCC). These are the 
main distinctions of the LNG liquefaction, though variations continue even within each 
distinction. Various factors are considered when deciding which process to install in real 
LNG plants, not just efficiency because efficiency of the process varies according to the 
capacity of the plant. The capacity of a train has increased from 0.5 MMtpa to 8 MMtpa. A 
larger capacity train provides economy of scale, which lowers the capital cost, but multiple 
smaller capacity trains allow operational flexibility. Until 2000, 90% of LNG plants 
worldwide selected propane pre-cooled mixed refrigerant process (C3MR); after 2000, the 
cascade system expanded its share to 18% but C3MR has 74% share including AP-X 
process. In a typical cost allocation, a liquefaction facility takes up the highest portion of 
30-40% in the whole LNG value chain. The historical unit construction cost of an LNG 
export terminal was about $300 per tonne per annum (tpa), but the costs of recent projects 
doubled (Mokhatab, Mak, Valappil, & Wood, 2014). For example, the total cost of the 
Sabine Pass LNG terminal, which is equipped with two 4 MMtpa LNG plants, is known to 
be $5.6 billion, about $700/tpa (hydrocarbons-technology.com, 2014).  
After the liquefaction, LNG is loaded into the LNG tanker, a specially designed ship 
for LNG transportation. It is necessary to maintain the cryogenic temperature during the 
LNG transportation, since the LNG will evaporate and expand to its original volume at a 
normal surface state. To prevent this phenomenon, LNG tankers have insulated storage; 
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spherical tanks are made of a special alloy of steel with aluminum and nickel; rectangular 
membrane tanks are made of steel and PVC or polystyrene. Despite this insulation, the gas 
boils off and the typical loss of gas is estimated to be 0.1-.0.25% daily. The total loss rate of 
the total LNG chain ends up being 2-6%. An LNG tanker uses this evaporated gas as its 
fuel. Sizes of LNG tankers vary from 30 cubic kilo meter (km
3
) to 265 km
3
. A 138 km
3
 size 
tanker can load 65,115 tons of LNG and it can serve a 4 mta capacity LNG plant if it can 
complete 33 times trips in a year. Shipping cost is expressed as daily charter rates and it 
fluctuates according to the market situation. Before 2009, it was around 
$60,000~70,000/day and dropped to $30,000/day after the economic crises from 2009 to 
2011, which was far below the break-even cost of $60,000/day. This postponed new ship 
orders and created a shortage of ship supply. As a result, in 2012, the rate soared to 
$150,000 and recently it stabilized at around $90,000/day (Odell, 2013). 
  After the LNG arrived at its destination, the gas need to be stored and re-gasified at 
import terminals to be supplied to retail markets. An import terminal mainly consists of an 
unloading berth, gas storage, and a regasification facility. Due to the seasonal variance of 
natural gas demand for heating, flexibility is required in supplying gas. The storages 
passively maintain the low temperature of LNG using insulation similar to the tanks on 
LNG tankers. Aboveground tanks, retired hydrocarbon reserves, and salt caverns can be 
used as storage. The gas gets re-gasified before it is sent to the retail distribution lines. 
Regasification is a simple heat exchanging process between the feed LNG and the heat 
transfer fluid. Utilizing sea water as the heat transfer fluid is the most popular method, since 
most LNG importing terminals are located close to the open ocean. Glycol-water, 
hydrocarbons, and even ambient air can be used as heat transfer fluids. However, these 
methods can reduce the throughput influenced by climate. For example, the seawater 
temperature drops during winter or in a cold climate. To cope with this fluctuation, a 
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submerged combustion vaporizer system places the heat exchanging tubes in a heated water 
bath. This increases costs by 1.5-3% because it consumes natural gas to heat the bath, but it 
is advantageous considering that it maintains the regasification rate constant and is easy to 
start up and shut down. LNG import terminals’ construction costs about 1/5 less than the 
construction of export terminals, but still requires a huge investment. For example, the 
Sempra terminal in Northern Mexico with 7.5 mta cost $0.8 billion (Chandra, 2006).  
  The total cost of LNG chain ranges from $2.8 to 4.6/MMbtu as shown in Table 3. 
.                                                                                                     (Unit: $/MMBtu) 
 
Table 3: Typical Cost Allocation of the LNG project as of 2003 (Mokhatab, Mak, 
Valappil, & Wood, 2014) 
2.1.3.4 Midstream Sector: Local distribution 
  LNG is delivered to the final customers via the local distribution pipeline networks, 
small fleets, and tank trucks. The residential/commercial sectors, the main focus of this 
thesis, are highly dependent on these local pipeline networks, called urban gas service. In a 
large city of a planned residential area with high population density, the urban gas service is 
a convenient and effective gas supply method, but is not favorable for the remote and sparse 
areas. Since local distribution is directly linked to the sales activity, this function can be 
included in the downstream sector. The technical aspects of this area are mostly similar to 
that of the transmission pipeline except for the length and diameter of the pipeline.   
components Low-end Cost High-end Cost
Gas Production 0.5 1
Liquefaction 1.5 2
Tanker transportation 0.5 1.2
Import Terminal 0.3 0.4
Total 2.8 4.6
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2.1.4 Demand and Consumption 
  It is obvious that the world’s energy demand is exploding. Worldwide total energy 
consumption in 2000 was 400 quadrillion Btu (Quad), and increased to 524 Quad in 2010, a 
30% increase over ten years. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its 
2013 report, forecasted that the world’s energy consumption will increase to 733 Quad by 
2040. Developing countries’ hunger for energy is well known as the reason of the exploding 
demand. Not one energy source can satisfy this soaring demand, and natural gas will fill 
some portion of the energy demand. The concern is regarding which source will be 
consumed more among those resources. Energy consumption is not decided by an 
individual’s decision; rather, the decision-making is systematic and it involves three main 
criteria: accessibility, economics, and environmental concerns. Natural gas fits the criteria 
to a substantial level. Natural gas is an abundant source. As discussed above in the 
formation part, natural gas forms at wider range of temperatures and pressures than oil. 
Technological advances made it possible to extract the gas from unconventional reservoirs. 
Natural gas was considered to be difficult to deliver, but now transmission pipeline 
networks and LNG transportation have solved the problem. In terms of economics, the price 
of natural gas in the North American market is at a historic low. Considering energy 
equivalent, a six to one ratio of the price between one barrel of crude oil and one MMBtu of 
natural gas is reasonable, but it has reached to 20 to 1 since 2009 (Powers B. , 2011). This is 
a unique phenomenon in the North America market, since the natural gas price in this 
market is decided on a market base, while other markets are linking the natural gas price to 
the oil price. However, this difference is creating arbitrage opportunities, which will be 
discussed later.  
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Figure 5: The price ratio between crude oil and natural gas in the US market 
 (Powers B. , 2011) 
Meantime, the production weighted price of coal in 2011 was $2.57/MMBtu while 
that of natural gas was $3.98/MMBtu (EIA, 2013b). However, this coals competitiveness 
reverses when it is compared to electricity generation cost. The levelized electricity 
generation cost entering service in 2018 by source presented that the cost of a gas turbine 
combined cycle (GTCC) plant is lower than that of a conventional coal-fired plant (EIA, 
2013c). Moreover, the efficiency of GTCC reached 60%; GTCC requires less than 60 
minutes for start-up after shut down (Gülen, 2013). The construction of GTCC plant takes 
three years, while coal-fired plants need five years (AEP, 2014). Thus, the gas’s economics 
advantage is improving and attracts more demand. 
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(unit: $/MWh)       
 
Table 4: US levelized cost of new generation resources entering service in 2018 (EIA, 
2013c) 
Other concerns regarding the energy consumption are environmental impact and 
safety issues. Fossil fuels emit greenhouse gases (GHG) like carbon dioxide (CO2), carbon 
monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulfur dioxides (SOX), mercury, and other 
particulates when they are burned. Natural gas is the cleanest fuel among fossil fuels; it 
emits a half of CO2, 1/5 of CO, 1/5 of NOX,1/2,500 of SOX , 1/400 of particulates, and no 
mercury compared to coal (Chandra, 2006). The international treaty to prevent climate 
change forces countries to reduce GHG emission; a shortcut to comply the agreement is 
replacing other fossil fuels with natural gas. Moreover, many countries are abandoning 
nuclear plants, another powerful competing energy source, and this energy source is likely 
to be substituted with natural gas. 
                                                                                                       (Unit: lbs/MMMBtu) 
 
Table 5: Comparative emissions levels of fossil fuels (Chandra, 2006) 
Plant type Capital Cost Operation Cost Transmission Cost Total Cost
Conventional Coal 65.7 33.2 1.2 100.1
Advanced Coal with CCS 88.4 45.9 1.2 135.5
GTCC 15.8 50.1 1.2 67.1
Advanced GTCC with CCS 34.0 58.2 1.2 93.4
Plant type Capital Cost Operation Cost Transmission Cost
CO2 117,000                                   164,000                                   208,000                              
CO 40                                              33                                              208                                       
NOX 92                                              448                                           457                                       
SO2 1                                                1,122                                        2.591                                   
Particulates 7                                                84                                              2.744                                   
Mercury 0.007                                        0.016                                   
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      With all these aspects considered, natural gas consumption is likely to increase and EIA 
estimated that the increasw will rise from 116.8 Quad in 2010 to 177.9 in 2040 with an 
average growth rate of 1.7%, the highest growth rate among fossil fuels. 
                                                            (Unit: quadrillion Btu) 
 
Figure 6: World energy consumption by fuel type, 1990-2040 (EIA, 2013a) 
  Like other hydrocarbon sources, natural gas is used in heating, lighting, electric 
generation, chemical feedstock, and transportation. EIA’s 2010 data and forecast about 
world natural gas use by sectors from 2010 - 2040, indicates the following: Industrial users 
consumed, in 2010, 39% of natural gas for heating, lighting, combined heat and power, 
process heating, and the feedstock for petrochemical and fertilizer, etc. U.S. petrochemical 
companies are expanding the use of natural gas as process feedstock due to the low price, 
and are expected to enjoy the competitive advantage, since their competitors are using an 
expensive petroleum feedstock, naphtha. Residential users accounted for 17% of natural gas 
consumption in 2010 and this use will grow with expanding urban gas networks in 
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developing countries. In electric generation, which consumed 33.6% of natural gas in 2011, 
natural gas will continue to expand its composition due to its relatively low price, 
substituting the old coal-fired utilities. The transportation sector is not growing substantially 
with only 3% share, but its feasibility will continue to be tested in the form of gas-to-liquid 
(GTL), compressed natural gas (CNG), and LNG.  
                                                                                                 (Unit: quadrillion Btu) 
 
Figure 7: World natural gas consumption by end-use sector, 1990-2040 (EIA, 2013a) 
2.1.5 Contracts and Price Determination 
 Transactions of natural gas can be divided into three main phases involve different 
entities and contracts: licensing, wholesale, and retail sales.  
2.1.5.1 Licensing 
At the licensing phase, an entity that wants to explore and produce needs to get a 
permit to do so from another entity that has the authority. In many countries, natural 
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resources’ rights belong to the nation or state except in North America, where private 
entities can own the resource right. In most cases, the producers are large international oil 
companies (IOC), because oil and gas exploration is very risky and requires experiences, 
technologies and huge capitals. Typically, the host, the hosting government (HG), or the 
national running oil company (NOC), or individuals in North America, endows the right to 
produce resources from the reservoir to a contractor, which is an IOC operating the 
production. Then, both parties need to sign contracts about sharing the output. This contract 
has a variety of forms, but its main distinctions are a concession and a profit sharing 
contract (PSC). In a concession contract, the IOC should pay a royalty proportional to the 
revenue from the well every year regardless of their profitability. In a PSC, the IOC is 
compensated for their expenses first and then shares the remained profit with the host. The 
concession guarantees the income for the host, but the windfall is shared with the host. PSC 
gives more income to the host during a boom, but smaller or zero stake during a recession. 
Today, to moderate these merits and demerits, hybrid contracts, combinations of the 
royalties and the profit sharing are common. The host is paid some portion of the royalty, 
next contractors cover their expenses, and then the remaining profit is shared between two 
parties. Additionally, the contractor should pay income tax on its profit separately 
according to the national tax law (Smith, et al., 2010).  
2.1.5.2 Wholesale 
           The contractors, then, need to sell the gas to the wholesalers. In a market like North 
America’s, contractors can sell gas directly to local distribution companies (LDC), but as in 
most cases of international transactions, a big intermediary dealer first imports gas to a 
country and then sells it to that country’s LDCs. The critical decisions regarding the 
transaction condition are made in the sales and purchase agreement (SPA) between the 
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producer and the importer. An SPA is a contract that includes terms, quantities, prices, and 
obligations. Terms vary from a one-time deal to tens of years. In the past, natural gas could 
only be purchased with a long-term contract that compensated for the risky investment. 
Long-term contracts still constitute a majority of the transactions, though spot markets are 
expanding. In the same light of this, some projects require a buyer to commit to buying all 
of the output; this is called a depletion contracts. Moreover, some projects requires a 
minimum or maximum quantity to be taken within specific periods such as daily, weekly, 
or monthly, when the production is subject to the continued operation. Even take or pay 
(TOP) obligation can be accepted to ensure the payout and continued operation, which 
forces buyers to take output gas or pay 60-95% of its price in case the buyers are not able to 
take them. Unfair provisions like fixed delivery points and transfer preventions prevailed in 
the past, because the market was seller-oriented (Chandra, 2006).  
            Price determination methods are also diverse. In the beginning stages of natural gas 
industry, natural gas exchange markets were not established. The first trade of natural gas 
on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) was made only after 1988 (Cooper, 
2006). Moreover, in the past natural gas transactions were mostly bilateral and veiled, so 
individual negotiation decided conditions. The most implemented method was linking the 
price of natural gas to the equivalent price of substitutes such as crude oil, gas oil, and fuel 
oil, which is called oil indexation. In the Asian market where most gas is imported as LNG 
and lacks indigenous gas resources, the natural gas price is linked to crude oil. For example, 
Japan’s customs-cleared price (JCC) first calculates the average price of a basket of crude 
oil imported to Japan during the month. Then, the weight of 16.67%, the heat-equivalent of 
natural gas to crude oil, is multiplied to this crude oil basket price and this type of contract 
is called “straight-line contract.” However, this parity can be adjusted by negotiation up or 
down. Some contracts add another modification that provides a ceiling to protect buyers at 
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high oil prices and floor to protect sellers at low oil prices. This type of contract is called an 
“S-curve contract” (EY, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 8: LNG contract slopes of JCC (EY, 2013) 
In the US market, which is regarded as the most competitive market, price is fully 
determined by supply and demand via exchange markets. Natural Gas Spot Prices at Henry 
Hub (HH spot) on the NYMEX is the most representative price index in the market. The 
spot and future exchanges are fully utilized by various financial tools like option, future and 
other derivatives. The European market is more diverse, since the market is composed of 
many countries that govern their market separately and the delivery forms are mixed with 
pipeline gas and LNG. This market has used the indexation of gas oil and fuel oil rather 
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than crude oil. However, the region is establishing exchange hubs such as the National 
Balancing Point (NBP) in the UK and new or renewing contracts are changing the price 
term to spot price indexation (Melling, 2010). The reason why spot price indexation is 
preferred more than oil indexation is the current decoupling of gas spot prices from oil spot 
prices. Gas spot prices are cheaper than the oil indexed price, as shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Figure 9: Historical movements of global gas price benchmarks (Timera Energy, 2011) 
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Due to this diversity, prices of natural gas differed by region, as shown in Figure 10.  
                                                                              (Unit: USD/mmbtu) 
 
Figure 10: A July 2013 overview of global spot gas price benchmarks  
(Timera Energy, 2013) 
2.1.5.3 Retail 
Once natural gas is transmitted to the regional market, it is delivered to LDCs and 
then to the end-users. In some countries, the large customers can import natural gas directly 
for their own uses. Different from the prior steps where principals of global demand and 
supply dominates (though some countries are controlling the importing step), local 
distributions in most countries are subject to governments’ regulations. The prices are 
calculated on a cost basis and the operations are controlled by national plans. LDCs are 
allowed to earn a reasonable profit and should not discriminate against consumers based on 
the service cost. However, places like the U.S. and the U.K. successfully liberalized their 
gas retail market and European countries are trying to make their retail market more 
competitive. Transaction practices vary by region and case, and it is impossible to deal with 
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the all types of market structure and regulations. In the next chapter, this thesis provides 
detailed cases of the retail market as it pertains to the Korean natural gas market. 
2.1.6 New Trends 
Natural gas served as modern society’s one of the main energy resources, but its 
importance is getting larger. Supply is increasing after shale revolution and the increasing 
supply is influencing on the trade practices. Many countries want a more competitive 
natural gas market and are establishing spot exchange floors and hubs. The trading system 
in the past natural gas market focused on securing the producer’s return on investment. 
However, the changes in market balance and introduction of new systems will enable the 
diverse types of transaction practices and risk managements used in other commodities to 
the gas business. Thus, the new trends will cast questions regarding the incumbent market 
structures that are implemented in each regions and countries. 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF KOREAN NATURAL GAS MARKET 
Because it is a country with little fossil fuel resources, Korea has a high foreign 
dependence regarding its valuable energy security. The country’s natural market allows 
monopoly and regulations preventing the abuse of the monopoly power. The following 
sections provide the basic features of the Korean natural gas market before discussing the 
effectiveness of the current market structure. 
2.2.1 Brief overview of the energy structure of Korea 
According to the 2013 annual report on Korea’s energy status by the Korea Energy 
Economics Institute (KEEI), Korea’s primary energy consumption has increased 
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consistently by 4~12% of annual growth rates from about 46 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (toe) in 1980 to 275 million toe in 2011. Since Korea’s main economic 
development driving forces are highly energy intensive, such as petrochemical, steel-
making, and other manufacturing industries, the industrial sector used 61.7% of its energy 
use in 2011. The major primary energy sources of Korea are fossil fuels such as oil, LNG, 
and Coal, which comprised 82.8 % of total energy sources, followed by nuclear power at 
11.7% of the energy supply in 2011. The critical factor threatening Korea’s energy supply 
stability is its high oversea dependency on import; it is importing 96.4% of its primary 
energy sources. This characterizes Korea’s energy structure and practices. 
 First, the Korean government is actively regulating its energy sectors on both the 
supply and demand sides. State-owned companies are dominating in regard to supplying 
electricity and natural industry, while their retail prices are regulated by the state or the 
government to support people’s lives. The petroleum industry is privatized but products are 
heavily taxed to maintain the fiscal income. Moreover, the Korean government pushes a 
strong policy to restrain energy consumption. For example, it regulates air conditioning or 
heating temperature inside commercial buildings, limits lighting hours for commercial uses, 
promotes the 5th-day-no-driving culture, and enforces corporations to decrease electricity 
consumption by 10%. All of these efforts are meant to secure energy stability, but they have 
a limited effect due to inconsistent energy price policy and a natural deficit of primary 
energy resources.1 
Second, as the result of government intervention in energy prices through regulation 
and taxation, the electricity price became low and the petroleum products price became 
expensive compared to other countries; electricity price was about half of the OECD 
average and kerosene price was 20% higher than the OECD average (KEEI, 2013). 
                                                 
1 The electricity price in Korea is relatively lower than other energy sources, which will be discussed later. 
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                                                                                                                                                        (Unit: $/liter) 
 
Table 6: Consumer prices of oil products in Korea as of 2011 (KEEI, 2013) 
     Thus, Korean consumers use electricity rather than petroleum and the electricity 
composition in Korean final energy consumption increased from 17.3% in 1990 to 41.1% in 
2012, while that of petroleum decreased from 52.4% to 14.9% during the same period.  
 
 
Table 7: Consumer prices of natural gas and electricity in Korea as of 2011 (KEEI, 
2013)    
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In order to maintain the low electricity price, the Korean government has promoted the 
implementation of nuclear plants. Nuclear generation comprises 26.3% of Korea’s 
electricity supply and the government announced its plan to build more nuclear plants to 
increase the composition of nuclear power in the energy mix to 29% (Mundy, 2014).  
Third, Korea has a larger oil refinery capacity than its domestic petroleum product 
demand even though it has little indigenous hydrocarbon reserve. Korea’s four main 
refinery companies have total refining capacity of 3.1 mil barrel per day (bpd) and they 
imported USD 100 billion of crude oil, but exported 51 billion dollars’ worth of petroleum 
products in 2011 (Kang & Bae, 2012). This alleviates the country’s burden to pay for 
domestic energy demands.  
2.2.2 Overview of demand in Korean natural gas market 
Fossil fuels comprise 86% of Korea’s primary energy source with an LNG portion 
of 16.8%. In 1986, Natural gas was first included into Korea’s energy mix and the primary 
energy consumption of natural gas reached 21 million toe (45.7 bcm) in 2011. The 
consumption as urban gas or LNG was 14 million toe; 6 million toe was used for electricity 
generation. In 2011, residential and commercial uses comprised 55.8% of the gas typed 
final consumption, followed by industrial usage of 38.9%, except the energy input for the 
electricity generation. Most final consumption, with the exception of the electricity, is 
supplied as urban gas regardless of end-use. The accessibility rate to the urban gas network, 
which indicates the ratio between the number of households accessible to pipeline networks 
and the number of total households, is 75% in average, 87% in metropolitan area and 63% 
in other area; this accessibility is considered to be saturated. The end use of natural gas 
devoted to heating purposes is not likely to increase substantially in the future because it is 
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competing with combined heat and power (CHP) and cheap electric heaters (Kim & Yoo, 
2013). 
                                                                      (Unit: 1,000 boe) 
 
Figure 11: Natural gas supply and demand by sectors in Korea (drawn from KEEI data) 
However, the top down ratio (TDR) of natural gas demand, the ratio of demand 
amount of peak month and bottom month, is high at 1.945 in 2012 (KOGAS, 2012); this 
swaying demand is caused by seasonal effect (demand is smaller in the summer and greater 
in the winter) and increases the gas purchase cost while deteriorating supply stability 
because of the high dependence on the spot market. Electricity generation, which improves 
demand stability with a low TDR, could increase considering the Korean government’s new 
long-term energy plan approved this year; the government announced that it will promote 
decentralized generation, of which a most available decentralized generation method is  
small gas-fired power plants (Yoon H. , 2013). 
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Figure 12: TDR of natural gas consumption in Korea (KOGAS, 2012) 
2.2.3 Overview of supply in Korean natural gas industry 
Korea had 1.0 bcm of proven reserves of natural gas at the end of 2011 and it 
produced 1.0 bcm that same year. The reservoir will deplete soon, after which it will be 
used as gas storage.  
 
 
Table 8: Major Korean LNG Supply Deals (BMI, 2013a) 
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Because the natural gas consumption in 2011 was 45.7 bcm, the rest of the country’s 
total, 44.7 bcm, was imported. Qatar, Oman, Malaysia and Indonesia have been the major 
countries exporting to Korea; recently this list expanded to include Nigeria, Russia, 
Australia, and the US (BMI, 2013a). 
The Korean Gas Corporation (KOGAS), a state-run company, is the only entity 
allowed to import natural gas into Korean market, though several utility companies are 
importing small amounts of natural gas for their own uses. Additionally, KOGAS and the 
Korea Oil National Corporation (KNOC) are investing or participating in the overseas 
projects to secure energy supply security.  
 
 
Figure 13: The map of LNG pipeline network as of 2011 (KEEI, 2012) 
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There are four LNG regasification terminals, three owned by KOGAS with a 56.5 
million (mn) tpa capacity and one owned by Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) 
with 1.7 mn tpa capacity. Two more terminals are under construction and will be completed 
by 2016, adding 9.5 mn tpa capacity. Total LNG storage capacity as of 2012 is 8.8 million 
cubic meter (mcm) and will increase to 15.3 mcm by 2017 (BMI, 2013a). The total length 
of pipeline networks as of 2013 is 4,065 kilo meter (km) and will expand to 4,312 km by 
2016. Accumulated capital investment for the networks reached KRW 7.7 trillion (KOGAS, 
2012).  
       Using this infrastructure, KOGAS supplies gas to its direct buyers like the Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) or to local distribution companies. Thirty-three urban 
gas companies monopolize split regions and distribute gas to end-users. 
 
 
Figure 14: Diagram of Gas market structure in Korea 
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2.2.4 Regulations 
The Korean Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE) is the principle policy 
maker and supervises the execution of energy balance and climate change issues as well as 
the ruling statutes regarding the natural gas is urban gas business act. The import of natural 
gas is decided in accordance with the national energy master plan, which is revised every 
five years, and the long-term natural gas supply/demand plan, which is revised every two 
years. Balance is also adjusted during the operation at times of necessity. As mentioned 
above, KOGAS is the only agency authorized to deliver natural gas into the Korean 
domestic market except a small amount of own-use by permitted companies. Local 
distribution business is open to the private sector; all thirty-three LDCs are private 
companies. However, LDCs also need permission from local governments to open a 
business. Since the natural gas business is regarded as a public service in Korea, LDCs are 
required to provide universal and non-discriminative services regardless of cost and 
difficulty of service unless the condition falls under the criteria designated by law. 
Transmission lines are planned and constructed mainly by the Korean government and 
KOGAS; distribution lines are installed by LDCs when they have agreed to share the cost 
between the LDC and the benefited customer. 
The most influential regulation on the business is regarding pricing. Prices have two 
steps: the wholesale price between KOGAS and LDCs and the retail price between LDCs 
and end-users. As a public good, cost-plus pricing methodology is accepted for natural gas 
in Korea, adding a reasonable return on infrastructure investment. First, the importing cost 
of natural gas provides the base for the pricing. The importing cost is consisted of LNG 
price, transportation costs like customs, sales tax, and importing dues. The price is adjusted 
every two months if the material price changes more than 3% during that time period. 
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Second, supplying costs will be added onto the importing cost. Supplying costs are the 
operating expenses of KOGAS and safety surcharges by law. After these charges, the 
reasonable return on the infrastructure investment is added; it is a similar concept to the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Last, the loss from the previous term is added. 
Since the price is pre-determined by dividing the estimated price and sales volume before 
the sales term started, if there is an unexpected loss from the excessive cost rise, the loss is 
added and divided by the estimated sales volume for the new term. This adjustment is 
applied once in a year. The retail price formula is pretty same: operating expenses and 
WACCs of LDCs are added to the whole price where LDCs are buying the gas from 
KOGAS. At any rate, the material cost, gas import cost, is the most important factor in 
determining gas price, since it takes up 83% of the total cost (Lee S. , 2013). 
 
Figure 15: Cost structure of the retail urban gas in Seoul (Yoon N. , 2009) 
2.2.5 Controversy on the Korean gas market structure 
In short, the Korean government’s policy goal regarding the natural gas industry 
structure is to supply natural gas stably and affordably. The government argues that its 
regulations are justified because: the importing price of natural gas into Korean market can 
be lowered by KOGAS’ purchasing power and the supply stability can be enhanced by the 
monopolized import; the centralized infrastructure plan prevents redundancy and waste of 
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national wealth; retail prices are regulated to prohibit the private companies’ excess profit. 
However, opponents of the current system criticize it for its lack of competition. They are 
skeptical whether KOGAS did their best to purchase natural gas at the cheapest price; there 
is no comparable reference because KOGAS is the only importer. Moreover, there is no 
incentive for KOGAS and LDCs to reduce their operation expenses because all of the costs 
are transferable to end-users. All of the alleged inefficiencies are denied in the name of the 
stable supply, but the old wisdom that the absence of competition always brings out 
inefficiency causes consternation for the public. Moreover, the global natural gas industry is 
facing a paradigm shift as discussed above and question the relevancy and efficiency of the 
incumbent structure in the new environment. 
In the light of this, an amended urban gas act was proposed last year, which aimed 
to permit private companies to import and sell gas in the domestic market (Yoon C. , 2013). 
However, parliament denied opening the market to private companies. The recently-passed 
act only permits the private companies to import and use gas for their own use or re-export 
(Seo, 2013). The pro-regulation perspective won the victory but the controversy remains 
unsolved. The latter part of this paper will explore the current controversy about the 
liberalization of Korean natural gas market and examine the validity of the arguments. 
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3. Debate on Korean Natural Gas Market Reform 
Government policy and regulation have played an important role in forming the gas 
industries in many countries, including Korea. This chapter explores different types of 
market structures and regulatory systems. Then, it discusses the current status of the gas 
industry in South Korea and the controversy regarding its market structure. Finally, it 
examines the validity of the arguments presented in the chapter.      
3.1 TYPES OF REGULATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE     
The obvious distinctions of market structure are a government-controlled non-
competitive market or a liberalized competitive market, though the degree of freedom and 
regulation varies. Some countries also have developed unique market structures according 
to their own situation. Regardless of the difference in structure, regulations are devised to 
enhance the industry’s efficiency either by directly controlling the market or promoting the 
competition. This section compares different types of markets in order to provide a 
background for the discussion of market structure. 
3.1.1 Government-controlled non-competitive market 
Natural gas was an unwanted by-product during the oil production before the 
introduction of high tensile steel pipelines and electric welding. The pipeline network was 
critical for the gas industry as natural gas became available only after the pipeline network 
connected producers and customers. The onset of the natural gas industry in the U.S. started 
as privatized market and it soon experienced a natural monopoly. The natural monopoly 
refers to a monopoly formed in an industry with a high economy of scale, which requires a 
large amount of investment that acts as a natural entry barrier. In this case, a market failure 
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occurs because of certain inefficiency. On the one hand, if the industry has competition 
with multiple players, redundancy in investment and expensive operational costs occur due 
to the low economy of scale, which is referred to as productive inefficiency. On the other 
hand, if a company succeeds in dominating the industry, the company has a monopoly 
status and will enjoy excessive profits. As a result, consumer benefits will be harmed; this is 
referred to as allocative inefficiency. Once this market structure is established, it has a 
strong entry barrier (Depoorter, 1999). Particularly in developing countries that lack capital 
and technology, the gas industry is initiated by the government or a state-controlled 
enterprise (SCE) to overcome investment difficulties. In this case, productive and allocative 
inefficiencies are believed to be removed since the whole industry is planned and 
established by a centralized scheme. Prices are also regulated to prohibit excessive profit 
seeking behavior by the monopolizing company. This is exactly what happened in South 
Korea, this paper’s country of analysis. Taiwan, another main natural gas importing area in 
Asia, has the same market structure. These countries allow one monopolizing SCE import 
and transmit gas. Then, they split their areas into small distribution divisions and let LDCs 
serve each area by endowing local monopoly status.  
 
 
Figure 16: Diagram of Market structure in a non-competitive market 
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3.1.2 Liberalized market 
     Meanwhile, in the U.S., severe allegations were raised about natural monopoly and 
companies’ abuses of their market power since private companies have comprised the 
industry from the start. Thus, regulatory efforts like a price cap and an entry limit to 
mitigate this market failure were implemented. However, those methods turned out to be a 
series of trial and error; the U.S. government finally realized that the absolute solution was 
to regard the pipelines as common carriers. Its diagnosis was that the monopoly power was 
endowed to neither producers nor customers but to pipeline service providers. Since they 
acted as the intermediary between producers and customers, they actually had the 
monopsony as well as monopoly; that is, they were paying less to producers and charging 
more to customers. The solution via U.S. regulation was functional unbundling and open 
access to the pipelines. The pipeline companies do not directly trade gas; rather, they only 
provide transportation services. If they established an affiliate to do intermediary business, 
they are forbidden to discriminate against other dealers in order to favor their own affiliate.  
 
 
Figure 17: Diagram of Market structure in a competitive market  
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        This equal status requirement applies to access to both physical infrastructure and 
information about tariffs and conditions. This change brought about a fully competitive 
market since shippers can deliver gas to any delivery depot and consumers can buy gas 
from any sellers without disadvantages. The United Kingdom also developed this kind of 
market structure. The exchange hub like Henry Hub and exchange market like NYMEX in 
the US can be highly developed because of the competitive environment; this exchange 
value acts as a benchmark price for physical transactions in the region. Thus, the industry is 
fully operated on market-base in this market (Bosselman, Eisen, Rossi, Spence, & Weaver, 
2010). 
3.1.3 Vertically integrated local monopoly 
Another type of market structure is that of a vertically integrated company with 
local monopoly status. This monopoly can be a natural monopoly, like in the U.S. in the 
past, or a legally enforced monopoly, like in Japan. Natural gas producing countries used to 
have a local natural monopoly and each country introduced different remedies to cure the 
monopoly problem. As previously discussed, the U.S. solved this through competition; in 
contrast, Italy nationalized the industry in the 1950s. However, Japan opened this industry 
to private companies from the beginning. It endowed a local monopoly right as well as 
importing permission to LDCs. The large consumers like utility power companies (UPC) 
also received importing permission. Thus, the markets for general consumers and the large 
industrial consumers separated. Large industrial consumers import independently for their 
own use and LDCs establish individually vertically-integrated processes that include a wide 
range of duties, from importing to marketing. The monopolizing LDCs have built their own 
local networks and importing terminals, but they have not connected them into a nationwide 
network (Tokyo Gas Corporation, 2008). Consequentially, the local monopoly is very 
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strong and the entry barrier is even higher than in other countries. The gas companies are 
importing only 35% of the nation’s gas import amount and large industrial users 65% (BMI, 
2013b); this results in the expensive and varying residential retail prices by local areas.  
 
 
Figure 18: Diagram of Market structure of integrated local monopoly  
Countries have chosen the market structure based on their own situation. Some 
countries liberalized; other countries are still controlling the market. The effectiveness of 
the structure is also up to the country’s own situation. Most countries had monopolized and 
regulated market structure in the past to alleviate the market failure caused by natural 
monopoly. However, given the successful transition to the free open competitive markets of 
the U.S. and the U.K., many countries want to follow that trend. European countries have 
long attempted reforms on their natural gas market, but the Asian region, which is 
geopolitically short of negotiation power, lags behind the trend. Japan attempted the 
liberalization of natural gas market in 1995, but it was unsuccessful due to aforementioned 
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strong local monoply. Taiwan also attempted to open its gas market in 2003, but failed to 
induce investment from the private sector and obtain consensus on the reform. Since 1999, 
South Korea has discussed gas market reform, when the country suffered an economic 
crisis and was aided by the IMF, but there have been few changes so far.  
3.2 KOREAN NATURAL GAS MARKET 
Many countries developed and managed their gas industry as a public sector. In the 
beginning of industrialization in South Korea, the government drove the economic 
development and since the 1980s the gas industry was also established under the 
government leadership. The original structure still remains, but the voices demanding 
reform are also rising. This section examines the reasons for reform and related events. 
3.2.1 Rationales for reform of the Korean natural gas market 
An SCE like KOGAS is favored by the government as it executes governmental 
policy and has a good policy measure to cure the natural monopoly in terms of efficiency. 
These measures include supplying public goods, removing negative externality, and 
promoting positive externality. Moreover, the government can support the start-up of the 
industry with high investment cost and redistribute the wealth from the industry to society 
(Ahn, 2005). In light of this, the central government of Korea established KOGAS and 
municipalities established LDCs to develop the natural gas industry. KOGAS was given a 
monopoly right in import and transmission and LDCs local distribution by law. This 
structure was somewhat inevitable, though opinions vary, considering the economic 
capability of the country at the time--it lacked capital and technology. Later, governments 
privatized the matured industry and, in Korea, all of the LDCs were eventually sold to 
44 
 
private companies. However, they still hold their local monopoly status and KOGAS 
maintains its public ownership and monopoly in import and transmission.  
This incumbent market structure bears the possibility of inefficiency for two 
reasons: monopoly and moral hazard. A monopoly company’s demand curve forms above 
its marginal revenue curve; the price is decided by the monopolizing company at a higher 
level where its marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Thus, the production quantity is 
smaller and the price is higher than those in a competitive market. The monopoly company 
takes consumer surplus since the consumers pay more than they want; the economy has a 
dead loss since the company reduces production to be smaller than the amount that the 
economy can consume if met by the supply (Posner, 1975).  
 
Figure 19: Comparison of equilibrium in competitive market and non-competitive market 
(Riley, 2012) 
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  To prevent this loss and excessive profit, the government intervenes and regulates 
the price to be equal to marginal costs. However, the allocative inefficiency is unavoidable 
if the average cost is higher than this marginal cost since the price should be higher than the 
average cost to protect the supplier from loss. This can happen particularly in an industry 
with high economy of scale. Now, the wholesale and retail prices of natural gas in South 
Korea are in controlled by its central government and its municipalities. Regulated prices 
are decided based on cost and doubt cast on the genuineness of this cost. It is probable that 
consumers are paying more than they should, if the companies are inefficient and neglect 
effort to reduce the cost and many theories tried to explain this probability.  
  In agent theory, the inefficiency occurs because a principal fails to perfectly 
monitor its agent’s performance. The failure is unavoidable due to the informational 
asymmetries; the agent knows better than the task because it is in the middle of the task. 
Thus, there are motivations for the agent to pursue its own interests rather than the 
principal’s interests and the principal will get a lower return than expected as a result. To 
prevent this moral hazard, the principal should devise and utilize incentives so that the 
agent’s goal should be aligned with that of the principal (Gibbons, 1998). Applying this 
theory to the Korean gas market, a market is regulated and monopolized because it is 
regarded a public service irrespective of the ownership types of the participating companies. 
The consumers are the principal in this situation, but they are indirectly hiring the service 
providers. Even though consumers are paying the price for gas, the companies are more 
subject to governmental order than consumer’s requests because the service providers are 
licensed by the government and municipalities; their profitability is up to the government or 
municipalities’ approval. As a result, the companies fail to serve customers to their 
maximum satisfaction. 
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Some parties argue that the current structure is more inefficient because the main 
part of the industry is executed by an SCE, KOGAS. The property theory explains the 
inefficiency of SCE in terms of company’s ownership. The theory argues that the privately 
owned company is more efficient because the owner is a residual claimant, which means 
that he or she receives extra earnings by his or her effort to perform better, while an SCE 
does not have that incentive (Kim & Mahoney, 2005). Moreover, in pubic choice theory, 
the SCE does not act to maximize public interest but to maximize labor interest in the 
public sector (Engelen, 2007). The government also pursues its own goal, like reelection, 
and utilizes the SCE as a reward for the politicians who contributed to the election. Since 
the gas industry in Korea consists of both SCE and private companies, agent theory more 
universally explains about the inefficiency problem than other theories. This argument then 
expands to the debate on reform of the Korean natural gas market.  
3.2.2 Reform attempts in the Korean natural gas market 
After the economic crisis in the 1990s, the concept that privatization equals 
efficiency improvement prevailed in Korea. The Korean government planned to divide 
KOGAS into three importing parts and a transmission component and then to sell the 
importing parts to the private sector. As a preliminary arrangement for the plan, KOGAS 
went public in 1999, and a 40% share was sold to private shareholders. However, further 
attempts to privatize KOGAS failed since the exporting parties denied transferring the SPA 
to the purchasers of the KOGAS business. Since then, the plan has diverted focus, changing 
the market into a competitive one rather than privatizing KOGAS. The plan is to open the 
importing function to the new entries and liberalize the local distribution market. However, 
this plan also has failed due to opposition from the labor union of KOGAS and LDCs 
(KFTC, 2009a). The plan to improve the efficiency of natural gas industry by a competitive 
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market is still ongoing despite the failures, but there seems to be no consensus about 
liberalizing the gas market in Korea. The latest event regarding gas market reform was last 
year’s proposed urban gas act. As discussed above, the proposed urban gas act originally 
included the decisive change to open the natural gas import function to 3
rd
 party private 
companies, but ended up only allowing 3
rd
 party companies to resell their imported gas to 
the foreign market and not to the domestic market.  
  The failure of the original bill’s passage was influenced by the unique psyche in 
Korea and another event happened in the railroad sector last year. There is a unique 
negative sentiment about the competitive market and enterprise activities in South Korea. 
Even though South Korea’s economy is established under capitalism, people regard private 
profit seeking behavior as undesirable. This sentiment formed in the rapid economic 
development period during military dictatorship in the late twentieth century, when 
entrepreneurs took advantage of partnership with corrupt political power (Powers C. M., 
2010). The problem is that the introduction of competition and privatization are often taken 
in the same breath since people think that new entry companies to the liberalized market are 
likely to be private conglomerates. Thus, any attempt to induce competition in the public 
service sector faces severe opposition from left wing politicians and activists. As a recent 
example, the South Korean government approved a reform plan of Korail in 2013, the state 
owned railroad company, to spin off an affiliate to operate new lines and compete with 
Korail. The backlash was fierce; Korail’s labor union went on strike and the public showed 
their negative opinion by staging demonstrations against this reform. This was apparently 
not a privatization since Korail was establishing an affiliate, but the potential possibility 
that the affiliate could be sold to a private company in the future was enough to bring out 
the opposition. Although Korail is notorious for its huge deficit and inefficiency, fears of a 
rising fare and the closure of the unprofitable line in profit seeking behavior dominated 
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people’s sentiment (Park E. , 2013). Backed by this sentiment, arguments arose that the 
government should cease to open the gas market due to the unique characteristic of South 
Korean gas market. This atmosphere acts as a strong obstacle in the reform of the gas 
market, but the assertion is irrational and biased in some aspects. The next section will 
introduce in detail and rebut the main opposition reasons about gas market liberalization. 
3.3 FURTHER DEBATE ON REFORM 
There are three main reasons for the opposition to liberalize the South Korean 
natural gas market: the belief that natural gas should be a universal public service, the trust 
that the current regulation is the remedy for potential inefficiency due to natural monopoly, 
the faith that the unified purchase is an advantageous method of gas procurement due to 
purchasing power. 
3.3.1 The discussion of public service 
The first argument is that natural gas is a public good and so it is better to be 
supplied by public sectors because private sectors are pursuing profit maximization, which 
can cause a price surge and the exclusion of unprofitable customers. In this argument, the 
term “public good” has multiple meanings. It is used as a sociological term to indicate that 
natural gas is deeply related to people’s lives mainly because gas is used as a fuel for 
residential heating and cooking. Thus, some people argue that gas is an essential good. 
However, in order to satisfy the strict economic definition of an essential good, the item 
should have low price elasticity and have hard-to-find substitutes (Benson, 2002). In these 
terms, energy is absolutely essential, but it does not necessarily mean that each fuel is 
essential. As discussed above, fossil fuels are competing with each other according to their 
efficiency and situational economics. Moreover, gas is not just used for residential heating 
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but also for industrial use. A similar fault can be found in terms of public goods. The 
characteristics of a public good are that, once the good is produced, a consumer cannot be 
excluded from using it; there will be no additional cost or competition for additional users. 
In light of this, gas itself is not a public good, though urban gas networks can be a club 
good. Once the pipeline network is installed, people in the network are anchored to use it, 
and the connection cost is very low for each consumer within the accessible distance to the 
network. However, gas has a unit cost and is a limited good. Though the price elasticity of 
urban gas is low for a customer once he or she included into the network and he or she 
would not want to be excluded from the service, in reality, the customer fails to pay the fee 
is already being excluded or limited from the service. Moreover, supplying gas to a remote 
and sparse area via pipelines is questionable considering the high construction cost and 
safety risk. In modern life, electricity is becoming more essential since electric devices can 
be activated by electricity only, but heating or cooking has many substitutes like oil or coal, 
which are more appropriate for difficult circumstances. This is the matter of convenience, 
not of essentialness. Thus, the idea of “publicness” of natural gas does not compute.  
In regards to the universal service of natural gas, service is already universal in cost-
efficient areas. The accessibility rate to Korean’s urban gas network is 77% on average, 
88% in metropolitan areas, and 64% in other areas, and is considered to be saturated (Sung 
& Yoo, 2014). The extension of the pipeline networks should be decided case by case 
according to economics and the cost share between customers and suppliers. The pipeline 
installment fee is actually already paid by customers, though people think the existing 
network is free. The invested capital expense is being amortized as depreciation cost (NTS, 
2010). Thus, there will be no practical difference between the service from the public sector 
or the private sector. 
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Another concern causing worry is the fear of price surge due to privatization. As 
explained above, in Japan, the retail gas price is much higher than in Korea. People think 
that the higher price is because of privatization but it is actually because of the economy of 
scale in supplying cost based on the one-time consumption amount. Large consumers have 
a simpler supply chain and require smaller cost with regards to gas procurement (Hong, 
2010). The cross subsidizing from large consumers to general consumers looks favorable 
for general consumers and separating the market will raise prices for the general consumers. 
However, price distortion needs to be evaluated in light of the overall economy. The 
lowered gas cost for the large consumer will enhance their competitiveness and eventually 
benefit the economy and small consumers as a whole. As discussed above, distorted 
electricity price influences inefficient energy consumption in Korea. Therefore, a price 
reflecting the market situation is the best solution (Lee S. , 2011). The effect of the price 
can be alleviated through social security, such as subsidizing poor people.  
3.3.2 The discussion of natural monopoly 
Regarding the natural monopoly problem, it is uncertain if the gas industry really 
belongs in this category since the high capital expenditure problem that causes the natural 
monopoly does not continue in the gas industry once pipelines are installed. Some people 
think of gas transmission and distribution as a kind of network industry like the railroad or 
telecommunication, which is the representative example of an industry with natural 
monopoly. A network industry has interconnected nodes, which are components of its 
products, and establishing connections of those nodes constitutes the firm’s product. 
However, the term “network” connotes the hasty prejudice with which people regard a 
“network industry” if the industry has a network-shaped facility. Some people just use the 
term “network industry” for the gas industry because of its gas pipeline networks. However, 
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gas pipeline networks fall short of the two main qualifications needed to be a network 
industry: the presence of externality and the need for repeated investments due to radical 
technology advancement.  
In a network industry, the value of the last node does not decrease unlike the law of 
demand, since the last node is creating another individual product (Gottinger, 2003). For 
example, in the telecommunication industry, the joining of the nth new customer creates 
2*(n-1) number of new products, since he or she will be connected to the previous n-1 
customers and those connections constitute individual products. In other words, the entry of 
the new customer z ,the 24
th
 customer, to the network with a to y customer previously 
increases the product number from 22*23 to 23*24 by adding 2*23 products, since new 
combination of connection from a-y to z and from z to a-y are added to the network. It is 
same for the railroad network: a new station in Austin will create a new product from the 
capital city to Houston or Dallas, assuming that the network only had Houston and Dallas. 
The network with two stations originally had two products, providing two one-way routes 
from Dallas to Houston or from Houston to Dallas; after adding one more station in Austin, 
it has six products with the combination of the three stations. This is because of the multi-
directional connection of the nodes. In gas pipeline networks, the flow of gas is one-
directional. Gas flows from the storage node to the consumer node, but does not flow in the 
opposite direction. Connecting between consumer nodes does not constitute a product 
different from the examples above. Thus, the addition of the pipeline node to the gas 
network is not as valuable as in the network industry.  
Moreover, the network industry keeps requiring reinvestment of large amounts of 
money because technology development nullifies the previous networks and needs new 
networks to improve quality of service. Wireless telecommunication has improved the 
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speed and amount of service from 2G to LTE, and at the each phase of protocol, 
telecommunication companies should renew their network with huge amounts of 
investment. This industry trait is highly likely to be the barrier for the new entry and acts as 
the cause of natural monopoly. However, gas pipeline networks do not need to renew the 
whole of system after installment is done, except for maintenance or partial replacement.  
In the debate about the natural monopoly, an entry limit is defensible because it 
prevents inefficiency due to redundant investment. This argument about the distribution 
network in the gas industry is effective, but it is difficult to measure the redundancy 
regarding the other facilities like storages and terminals especially when considering export 
sectors in the open economy. When measured in terms of a closed economy, excessive 
capacity larger than domestic demand seems inefficient, but the extra capacity can be 
utilized to enlarge the pie through individual efforts to maximize the private interests in an 
open economy.  
Additionally, opponents of the competitive market argue that competition will be 
limited despite the open market because the gas industry is a capital-intensive business and 
only a few conglomerates can participate in the market (Ahn, 2005). This is plausible 
considering the current demand and market size, but the competition does not necessarily 
mean competition with an infinite number of contenders. In an economics theory of 
effective competition, a market can be competitive despite a small number of the 
participants. If the product is homogeneous and it does not have an entry cost, market 
leadership can be replaced by any second firm that can produce the product with a lower 
cost. Thus, the leading firms have incentive to innovate and be efficient in maintaining their 
market power. Therefore, the oligopoly market can improve the social benefit as far as the 
market is effectively competitive (Bender, Götz , & Pakula, 2011). The effective 
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competitive market is the common remedy for the network industry globally, but an 
assumption of the no entry cost is sometimes criticized. However, the gas industry does not 
require repeated investment in the pipeline network, companies can share the network, and 
there are many firms that want to participate in this industry, This indicates that the entry 
cost is effectively low. Moreover, the capital-intensive industry can virtually lower the 
entry cost through functional unbundling as in the U.S. gas market. Importing and 
delivering gas requires huge initial costs, but it does not mean that every company needs to 
be equipped with all the functions. The way in which the U.S. gas industry unbundled 
functions and increased participants illustrates this aspect, which is discussed in the chapter 
4.  
3.3.3 The discussion of purchasing power 
Aside from those debates based on economics theory, purchasing power is said to be 
another advantage of having a single importing company for the country. Although South 
Korea is the second largest LNG importing country after Japan, KOGAS is the largest LNG 
importing company because multiple importers are importing gas separately in Japan. The 
proponents of a single importer for a country argue that this purchasing power helps 
KOGAS to purchase gas in a cheaper and stable way since the international natural gas 
market has been seller-oriented (Hong, 2010). 
However, this argument has no empirical proof and there are many factors 
influencing importing price rather than purchasing power. Research on the comparison of 
the natural gas importing price between Japan and Korea in 2013 showed that the natural 
gas importing price of KOGAS was higher than Japan’s average natural gas importing 
price. KOGAS imported gas at $741.25/ton, while Japan imported gas at $647.29; this 
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higher price was found through the period from 2006 to 2009 (Han, 2013). Moreover, the 
importing price of KOGAS was also found to be higher than K-Power and POSCO in 2003 
(Yoon C. , 2013).  
 
                                                                                                                  (Unit: $/ton)      
Year   Korea Japan Gap 
2006  478.91 367.54 111.37 
2007  491.77 398.68 93.09 
2008  741.25 647.29 93.96 
2009  495.77 467.19 28.58 
Table 9: Comparison of gas import prices between Korea and Japan from 2006 – 2009  
(Han, 2013) 
 KOGAS rebutted this allegation, providing three explanations. First, because of the 
high TDR of Korean market, KOGAS can help but use more spot purchase during winter, 
which is typically more expensive than long-term contracts. Second, contract price is highly 
dependent on the market situation at the time of the contract. K-power and POSCO could 
buy natural gas in the early 2000s when the market situaltion was favorable for the buyers. 
However, KOGAS could not renew the expired long-term SPA because of political 
uncertainty. In the early 2000s, the discussion about KOGAS reform was underway and 
there was a possibility that KOGAS could be privatized. Since Korean government failed to 
execute the reform plan because the exporters denied a tranfer of the importing right to the 
merger upon the government’s first try to privatize KOGAS, it hesitated to approve the 
contract renewal. As a result, KOGAS had to buy gas from spot market and could renew the 
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contracts only after 2006, when the market situation changed to a seller’s market (Choi H. , 
2013). 
However, another allegation arose about KOGAS’s gas import misstep. KOGAS 
concluded a twenty-year term SPA with Sabine Pass Liquefaction (SPL) of Cheniere 
Energy partners at highest price compared with other companies that contracted with SPL. 
The contracted price was $ 11.75/ MMBtu with annual purchase of 3.5 Million ton. This 
price was higher than $11.24, Spanish Gas Natural cost and the same price (for the same 
amount of purchase) as Indian Gal. Even this SPA was supported by the Korea trade 
insurance corporation and the Export-Import Bank of Korea providing 1.5 billion dollars of 
project financing to the SPL project, while the Indian Gal had no other additional condition. 
KOGAS also offered the excuse that the Spanish Gas Natural’s lower price was due to the 
duty to pay some portion of contracted amount without receiving gas in case of Force 
Majeure (Lee D. , 2013).  
Ironically, KOGAS’s excuses about these inefficient purchase activities illustrate 
that there is no such thing as purchasing power. Even if admitting the existence of 
purchasing power, it is not necessary to unify the whole purchase amount of natural gas into 
a single importing company. Purchasing power can be formed when a certain threshold is 
reached in an individual transaction. In fact, KOGAS is the largest LNG buying company 
as a whole, but it divides its procurement into multiple contracts. Thus, the purchase 
amount of a transaction is not overwhelmingly larger than other companies’. In the above 
example of the SPL account, the purchase amount was the same as those of Gas Natural and 
Gal, and BP’s was much larger, 5.5 million tpa.  
The ability to make an advantageous contract is more dependent upon other 
conditions than the amount itself, as KOGAS insisted. For example, every country has 
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difficulty achieving cheaper and stable supplies of gas because of TDR. Korea is paying 
more because the TDR is much higher than other countries, 1.9 as shown in Figure 12. 
Japan alleviated this by restructuring its overall energy practice, reducing the TDR to 1.4. 
Restructuring ranged from pricing restructuring to the promotion and creation of a new gas 
refrigeration system to increase gas usage during the summer (Chung, 2010). These reforms 
were not driven by the government but by the private sector in efforts to be efficient and 
profitable.  
Some people argue that KOGAS is advantageous in its global business because it is 
supported by the guarantee of Korean government. This was effective when the global 
supply was dependent on a few countries. However, the global supply and the number of 
suppliers are increasing after the shale revolution; the market is finding a power balance 
between buyer and seller. As mentioned above, Indian Gal could buy gas without any 
governmental support. Despite difficulties, there are many private companies doing 
business without governments’ guarantees. 
 Another problem with the centralized gas import is that the responsibility is too 
heavily imposed on KOGAS and this responsibility forces KOGAS to make inefficient 
decisions. After the conclusion of the SPA with SPL, KOGAS added another SPA from Ras 
Gas 3 of Qatar, even though it had already secured an import amount to satisfy the expected 
demand from 2017-2024. The problem was that, to resolve the surplus of supply, KOGAS 
agreed to resell 20% of the shale gas from SPL to French Total. The price of the shale gas 
from SPL is $ 11.75/MMBtu, while that of the Qatari gas is $ 15.3/MMBtu, but Qatari gas 
is bound by TPA; thus, KOGAS had to resell the cheap shale gas rather than the expensive 
Qatari gas (Lee D. , 2013). As long as KOGAS is the single company to be responsible for 
the whole natural gas supply to South Korea, this nonsense can continue to happen, since 
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KOGAS has no flexibility. This inefficiency influence the downstream sector since the 
material cost takes up 83% of the retail price. Moreover, the supply cost of LDCs is highly 
likely to be inefficient considering their local monopoly status. 
Even though people admit that the current non-competitive market structure is 
problematic after all of those above rebuttals, they are reluctant to agree that a competitive 
market is the right solution. Theoretical debate is not enough to convince people that a 
certain type of market is better so an empirical benchmark is required. The following 
chapter suggests a good benchmark for the competitive energy market.  
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4. Empirical Case of Competitive Energy Market in Korea 
There has been a fierce debate to determine whether or not the competitive market 
for the energy sector is appropriate and viable. To support their arguments, people want a 
more directly comparable case for Korea and have usually tried to find a benchmark with an 
overseas example. However, ironically, an example of competitive energy market can be 
found within the Korean territory. There have been many cases comparing the gas market 
with the electricity market to analyze the effect of privatization, since both sectors are run 
by the public sector in Korea; yet currently there have been no attempts to compare the 
similarity of the oil and gas industries.  
These two industries have three aspects in common: both are hydrocarbon fuels, are 
imported, and require a huge amount of capital investment. Petroleum products are 
critically related to people’s lives as they are an energy fuel. Oil comprises the largest 
portion of the nation’s primary energy consumption. To some degree, oil is more critical 
than gas because 99% of transportation fuel is comprised of oil. As discussed before, 
heating and cooking have substituting fuels, but transportation is dominated by oil; still 
there have been fewer calls to deem gasoline or diesel essential goods rather than natural 
gas. Moreover, since Korea has few hydrocarbon reserves within its boundaries, 100% of 
crude oil is imported. The industry is highly capital-intensive because of the expensive and 
massive infrastructure consist of refinery plants, storages and importing ports, distribution 
pipelines, and fuel stations. This causes a high probability of a monopoly or oligopoly. 
Thus, cheap and stable supply of oil is very important just like natural gas.        
This similarity between gas and oil has been ignored, and policy approaches to these 
industries have been totally different in Korea. The gas industry is served by the public 
sector and the oil industry by the private sector. The oil industry experienced a sea change 
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regarding the regulation and deregulation. Thus, the oil market provides an excellent 
analogy for the effectiveness of a competitive energy market. This chapter examines the 
validity of the allegation that the competitive natural gas market will deteriorate the social 
benefit through an analysis of Korea’s competitive petroleum product market. 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF KOREAN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS MARKET    
4.1.1 Overview of demand in the Korean petroleum market 
In 2011, oil comprised 38.2% of Korean primary energy consumption, which takes 
up the largest portion of the country’s energy mix. The portion has decreased from 50.6% in 
2001 to 38.2% in 2011, but the absolute amount has not decreased; it has been around 2 
million (MM) barrels per day (bpd) since 2000.  
                                                                                                               (Unit: Mbpd)   
 
Figure 20: Supply and consumption balance in Korean oil industry (KEEI, 2012) 
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In final consumption, industrial use of oil has a high proportion because 716 Mbpd 
of oil is used as feedstock for the petrochemical industry, which does not use it as a fuel and 
this use will be excluded from the topic of this paper hereafter. Thus, as pure energy use, 
1.3 MMbpd of oil is finally consumed. Transportation use comprises 31% of total oil 
consumption, supporting 99% of transportation use. Electricity generation uses 6% of the 
oil, and 13% is used for residential/commercial use (KEEI, 2012). As in most other 
countries, the transportation sector is locked in by oil, and this implicates that oil can be 
critical to people’s life, because of the absence of substitutes.  
4.1.2 Overview of supply of the Korean petroleum industry 
The modern oil industry in Korea started with the establishment of Korean Oil 
Corporation (KOC) in 1966. Before this, major American oil companies like Standard, 
Caltex, and Shell supplied imported petroleum products. The Korean government needed a 
self-sufficient oil supply to support economic development and wanted to build an 
indigenous refinery plant. Due to the lack of capital and technology of the poor country, the 
first refinery plant with a capacity of 35 Mbpd was built with the help of foreign oil 
company, Gulf. The second plant, Honam refinery (currently GS Caltex) was built through 
a Joint venture between Korean Lucky (currently GS) and Caltex (currently Chevron); other 
refinery plant construction plans followed. Backed by surging demand, the total refinery 
capacity of the country increased to 840 Mbpd in 1993 when the market was liberalized 
(which will be explained in detail later). During the liberalization, KOC was privatized and 
merged by SK Innovation (SK). Today four major refinery companies operate in Korea: SK 
and its affiliate SK Incheon petrochemical (IC), GS Caltex (GSC), Hyundai (HD), and S-oil 
(SO) (Lee M. , 2013). The capacity expansion continued after market liberalization, and as 
of 2012 the current capacity is world’s sixth largest with 3 MMbpd, one-third times larger 
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than the country’s domestic consumption. For a single plant, the capacity of Korean 
refineries is at a high rank worldwide, which illustrates the scale of economy. Korean 
refinery companies are world-renowned to be competitive in their operation and high 
quality of products. Petroleum products exported by those companies comprised 10% of the 
whole national export in 2012.                                                                                                           
                                                                                       (Unit: Mbpd)   
 
Table 10: The status of refining capacity by companies in Korea  
         Those companies are operating their own marine transportation system and their 
inland pipeline transportation is served by Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation (DOPC); 
distributing the products from plants to storage centers (DOPC is an independent pipeline 
service provider; it began as a SCE in 1990, but was privatized in 2000). Tank trucks 
deliver the products from storage centers to gas stations or final consumers.  
There are 528 wholesale agents and 99 are exclusively franchised by the Korean 
refinery companies as of 2012. The number of gas stations totaled 3,882 before 
liberalization and increased to 13,495 by 2011. Refinery companies trade 40% of their 
products directly with gas stations and utilizing agents for 47.4% of their sales. 82.3% of 
the products are sold through gas stations and small stores occupy 5.4% of the market. The 
consumption by the large industrial users takes up 12.3%.  
 
Company CDU HOU
SK Innovation* 1,115                                   212                                      
GS Caltex 855                                      268                                      
Hyundai Oilbank 390                                      148                                      
S-oil 669                                      134                                      
Total 3,029                                   762                                      
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Figure 21: The diagram of the sales channel composition (Choi & Hwang, 2013) 
The refinery companies are deeply engaged with the retail market; 91% of the 
stations are franchised with the refinery companies, including the refinery owned or 
operated stations (8.7%) and agent owned or operated stations (5.1%). Gas stations’ average 
sales per month is around 1,000 barrels; Germany is, for example, over 2,000 barrels per 
month. Thus, industry experts argue that the supply side of the retail market is saturated in 
Korea and restructuring is required (Choi & Hwang, 2013).  
4.1.3 Regulations 
A timeline of the liberalization of Korean oil market can be categorized into three 
eras: pre-liberalization, liberalization, post-liberalization. The main exercises of 
liberalization policy were fulfilled starting in 1993, and the debate on the efficiency of the 
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free market after the crude oil price reached $100/bbl brought out more radical methods to 
induce increased competition in the market after 2008. 
4.1.3.1 Pre-liberalization 
Since government plan drove the development of the petroleum industry in Korea, it 
was heavily regulated. The stringency of regulation fluctuated, but the regulations aimed to 
prevent inefficient resource allocation and excessive profits of players, which is the same as 
the current policy goal for the natural gas market. Any operation of the oil industry 
including refinery, agent, and gas station needed the pre-approval of the government under 
the return or license system. The Law unbundled functions among the refineries, agents, 
and gas stations and refineries could not directly operate gas stations directly. Expansion of 
the refinery capacity needed permission from the government and all exports and imports of 
crude oil and petroleum products were executed under governmental control. Limits were 
placed on the number of agents and gas stations and restrictions were issued to regulate the 
start-up of new gas stations within a certain distance from existing stations. One late 
regulation on gas station operation was the Pole Sign system introduced in 1992, which 
prevent gas stations from selling different manufacturers’ products from the station’s pole 
sign, which indicated the sold products’ manufacturer. There was a price cap and the 
refinery companies’ profits were monitored so that they would not exceed 10% in terms of 
the rate of return on their assets. This pricing was linked to the price of crude oil and later to 
that of petroleum products. This methodology was designed by government until pricing 
was fully liberalized. Moreover, taxes were heavily imposed on petroleum consumption to 
limit consumption in a country without indigenous resources; these taxes still remain. 
Although during these periods the government regulated the industry for efficient resource 
allocation and the minimization of the excessive profits, this era is remembered as “Golden 
64 
 
Age” to those engaged in the industry. The supply used to be short of demand because of 
the delayed-response in the administration process; players were limited and the prices were 
cost-based. It would have been strange if there had not been excessive profits. This 
domestic regulation failure and the changes in the global market that had a long period of a 
low crude oil price evoked demands of liberalization (KNOC, 2011). 
4.1.3.2 Liberalization 
The first major movement of liberalization was the abandonment of the gas station 
distance restriction from 1993-1995. During this time, the number of gas stations increased 
dramatically and unit sales amounts plummeted. The combination of the distance restriction 
abolition and the pole sign system caused severe competition between the refinery 
companies and led them to recruit and develop new gas stations. The refinery companies 
also developed loyalty programs like membership services and promotional campaigns. To 
compensate for the profit loss from retail competition, convenient stores were introduced to 
gas stations, similar to U.S. gas stations. During this transition in the retail market, the 
government announced the petroleum industry liberalization plan in 1994. In accordance 
with that plan, regulations about pricing, import, and export of oil were removed in 1997. 
Competition created tectonics in the industry: the refinery companies went through the 
turmoil of M&A and four major companies ended up surviving; product imports were 
activated; the price competition between gas stations was ignited and self-service stations 
were implemented to be cost efficient in terms of gas station management; retail 
competitions intensified and marketing plans like memberships and promotions became 
essential in the competitions. However, the apparent oligopoly by the four major refinery 
companies provoked suspicion about the effectiveness of the deregulations. Although the 
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profitability had dropped for all tiers of the business, people still believed that excessive 
profits existed (Park & Park, 2004). 
4.1.3.3 Post - liberalization 
Another milestone of petroleum industry deregulation was brought about by 
external changes. Oil price was stable during the 1990s; the low price discouraged 
investments in locating oil resources and infrastructure. A later shortage in supply and 
increasing demand from developing countries raised the price beginning in the mid-2000s. 
Financial speculation added more impetus for the soaring oil price. As a result, after 2007, 
the crude oil price exceeded $100/bbl and this influenced the domestic petroleum product 
price as well. The tax increase during the financial crisis in the late 1990s worsened the 
situation such that the retail price doubled compared to that of ten years ago. People could 
not understand the rising price and demanded governmental investigation and intervention, 
which was a common practice in most countries. That surging price was quite systematic, 
but the government was pushed by negative public sentiment to look at the oil industry. 
Consequentially, the government found policy directions to promote more competition. The 
government forced refineries to publicly disclose weekly their average wholesale prices and 
built an on-line website providing live information about the street sales price of gas 
stations so that consumers could compare the prices and find cheaper gas stations. 
Moreover, the government loosened the pole sign system requirements, enabling gas station 
owners to sell mixed products from different manufacturers regardless of the manufacturer 
name on the pole sign. Horizontal transactions between an agent and another agent, a gas 
station and another gas station were also allowed. The government also advocated that 
warehouse stores implement complementary gas station in their parking lots. It even 
established an independent franchise brand of gas stations so that previously non-pole 
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stations could compensate for their weak marketing power. Sometimes, the government 
forced refineries to cut retail prices in the name of public interest with the unreasonable 
allegation of excessive profits. There also were reverse discriminations between refineries 
and importers. The government favored importers by exempting duties and customs and 
loosened the qualification for importers. The government also established an electronic 
exchange floor and favored the participants on the floor (Choi & Hwang, 2013). However, 
suspicions about the effectiveness of the policy prevail, since the methods were 
implemented to please the public rather than cure the problem. The market is actually 
formed with various types and numbers of players like agents, importers, and gas stations, 
but the government only focused on the regulation on refineries, assuming an oligopoly 
domination of the market. Those interventions were a kind of abuse of administration 
power and an unconstitutional fringe on private property rights. The aftermath influenced 
other players’ profits, not just refineries and led them to adjust their operations in 
accordance with the forced situation. Some people argue that if the government really wants 
to alleviate the problem in the people’s lives due to the expensive gasoline retail price, it 
should lower the tax rate, though the government refuses to do so because the tax revenue 
from the petroleum consumption in Korea is responsible for 16.9% of total tax revenue 
(Jeong, 2007). 
In sum, twenty years after the liberalization process, the debate on the effectiveness 
of the deregulation is still controversial. The opponents of the privatization view the 
example of the petroleum sector as a failure of the liberalization of the energy industry. 
They claim that market failure still exists since the Korean oil market ended up being an 
oligopoly structure and is inefficient. Conversely, there is much evidence that the market is 
working efficiently. Therefore, verification of the effectiveness of the liberalization of the 
petroleum sector is important in associating it with market reform in the gas sector.  
67 
 
4.2 COMPETITIVENESS OF THE KOREAN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS MARKET    
To verify if the liberalization policy succeeded in achieving its goal of cheap and 
stable supply of oil in the Korean market, two areas need to be examined: the existence of 
excessive profit and deficit production due to the incumbent oligopoly. If there were no 
excessive profit and deficit in production (the main signs of the market failure of the 
oligopoly), it would be possible to declare that the market is effectively competitive. 
4.2.1 Supply stability 
In either monopoly or oligopoly market, dominating firms will produce less 
quantities of the item than the perfect competitive market. Verifying this is not difficult 
because statistics shows the result. Korea’s total refinery capacity actually used to fall short 
of demand before liberalization. The country’s petroleum consumption had soared from 822 
Mbpd in 1989 to 2,025 Mbpd in 1996 and a deficit in capacity occurred during the same 
period of time. This deficit was resolved in 1997, only after liberalization, and Korea never 
had a deficit in capacity since then. Now, the total capacity is 3 MMbpd, which is much 
larger than the consumption. The operation rate has been high, from 80 to 99 %, so 
production amounts have exceeded consumption. Thus, the supply has been stable after 
liberalization. Therefore, the question is raised as to whether this surplus in the capacity is 
redundant investment or inefficiency; it is not. It has helped the stability of the industry. 
Refineries have exported the surplus amount in the open economy. Petroleum products have 
been one of Korea’s top three export items since 2009. The export alleviates the national 
burden in the current trade balance during the era of the soaring oil price since the 2000s; 
the profit from the export has actually subsidized the payment for crude oil procurement. 
The profit-seeking behavior of the refineries also enhanced refinery companies’ financial 
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soundness. To stay in the game, they expanded their business to petrochemical and 
lubricant manufacturing. Most of the refineries’ profits come from those sectors rather than 
petroleum products sales.  
 
 
Table 11: Comparisons between consumption and refinery capacity by years (KEEI, 
2012) 
Moreover, private companies are seeking a way to expand their upstream activities. 
Korea has tried but failed to find an indigenous oil reserve. The country then focused on 
acquiring shares from overseas reservoirs or participating in E&P projects. The role was 
given to KNOC since the cost of the duty was considered to be beyond the budget that the 
private sector could afford, but private energy companies soon followed, joining overseas 
E&P projects. The ratio between the output amount from the reservoirs and the countries 
import amount of oil and gas reached about 13.7% as a whole as of 2012. The investment 
amount grew to $ 42 billion by 2011; the amount invested by private companies reached 
$17 billion total (Kim C. , 2013).  
Year Capacity Consumption Gap
1981 790                                      539                                      251                                      
1988 840                                      717                                      123                                      
1989 840                                      822                                      18                                         
1990 840                                      1,017                                   (177)                                     
1991 1,036                                   1,209                                   (173)                                     
1992 1,442                                   1,454                                   (12)                                       
1993 1,675                                   1,591                                   84                                         
1994 1,700                                   1,750                                   (50)                                       
1995 1,818                                   1,905                                   (87)                                       
1996 2,018                                   2,025                                   (7)                                         
1997 2,438                                   2,211                                   227                                      
1998 2,438                                   1,836                                   602                                      
2000 2,438                                   2,033                                   405                                      
2011 3,010                                   2,036                                   974                                      
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Additionally, the refineries are also obligated to maintain a strategic reserve 
equivalent to forty days of their domestic sales amount, aiding the stability of the country’s 
energy security. 
All of these aspects indicate that the incumbent Korean market structure is 
providing fluent and stable supply of oil into the economy, which rejects the assumption of 
a deficit supply due to the oligopoly inefficiency. 
4.2.2 Price stability 
The debate about the oligopolistic power is more censorious in the matter of price. 
Many people are suspicious that the refinery industry is gouging people and enjoying the 
excessive profit rendered by market domination. Moreover, people cast more doubt on the 
wholesale market than on the retail market because of the existence of the four major 
refinery companies. In this section, the allegations will be examined in three aspects: Lerner 
index, price comparison by countries, and analysis on the refinery companies’ profit.  
4.2.2.1 Lerner index 
The apparent oligopoly incurs a strong allegation of market domination. The 
argument is that the refineries cooperate inexplicitly because they know how to price each 
other, since their cost structures are similar. Moreover, they used the same price formula 
that has succeeded and shared during the long regulated period. Allegation of the collusion 
gave rise to several investigations by the Korean Fair Trade Committee (KFTC), but they 
could not find critical proof to verify the allegation. KFTC accused refinery companies with 
some minor charge but many of them turned out to be not guilty after litigation. However, 
many people have not put a stop to their suspicions. Thus, the verification of effective 
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competition needs to start from the presence of the oligopoly power. The Lerner index is a 
common method to measure the degree of market domination in a non-competitive market. 
This index utilizes the property of the non-competitive market that takes the market demand 
curve to be the firm’s demand curve, while firms in the competitive market have a flat 
demand curve determined by market equilibrium. The profit of a firm is maximized when 
the firms’ marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue (MR). Formula 1 is the profit 
equation of a firm. 
   ( )     ( )                                                    (1) 
Formula 2 is acquired from the differentiation of formula 1; profit is maximized when this 
formula equals zero. 
 ( )      (    
  ( )
  
 )   
  ( )
  
                                     (2) 
 ( )     (    ( )    means MR in this equation and   ( )    means MC. In the 
perfect competition market, P of the firm equals MR and so     in  ( )     (  
  ( )   . Convesely, in the monopoly market,   = 1, since the monopoly firm takes the 
markets demand curve as its demand curve. In other types of market,   is between 0 and 1; 
a low index means higher competition.   , the price-elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, is 
found by plugging in price elasticity (  ) into formula 2. 
                    
  
  
 
 
⁄                                                          (3) 
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 )                                                   (4) 
 In case of oligopoly, the symmetric Cournot model insists that the profit will be 
equally shared among the oligopolistic firms. Thus, assuming n numbers of firms, the index 
is 1/n. Given that there are four major refinery companies, the theoretical index is ¼, if  
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oligopolistic power exists. However, the 2013 research of Choi and Hwang used the price 
elasticity adjusted Lerner index to verify the competitiveness of the Korean gasoline and 
diesel market; the index of the Korean gasoline market was nearly 0 during the period from 
January 2006 - March 2012.  
 
 
Table 12: Details of the price elasticity adjusted Lerner index of the Korean gasoline 
market from January 2006 - March 2012 (Choi & Hwang, 2013) 
Moreover, the regression of the index by months showed that the index had 
decreased during the same period. 
 
 
Figure 22: The trend of the price elasticity adjusted Lerner index of the Korean gasoline 
market from January 2006 - March 2012 (Choi & Hwang, 2013) 
  (P-MC)/P ηp  θ 
Mean  0.27622 0.14613  0.03965 
Median  0.26458 0.14517  0.03978 
Maximum  0.42424 0.23407  0.05883 
Minimum  0.09629 0.07668  0.01535 
Standard 
deviation 
 0.06866 0.02644  0.00939 
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4.2.2.2 Price comparison by countries 
The comparison of gasoline and diesel prices by country can provide more direct 
basis for decision about whether oligopolistic power exists or not. The comparison of price 
before tax between 23 OECD countries, performed by Choi and Hwang, shows that the 
price before tax of petroleum products in Korea is lower than those of the OECD average as 
shown in table 13.                                                                                                     
                                                                     (unit: KRW; as of the third week of July, 2012) 
 
Table 13:       The comparison of auto fuel prices before tax among OECD countries 
 (Choi & Hwang, 2013) 
 
Country Gasoline price Rank Diesel price Rank
Japan 1,133                                   1 1,213                                   1
Denmark 1,071                                   2 1,213                                   1
New Zealand 1,061                                   3 1,213                                   1
Belgium 1,061                                   3 1,091                                   7
Ireland 1,023                                   5 1,086                                   8
Italy 1,018                                   6 1,057                                   13
Portugal 1,016                                   7 1,099                                   6
Spain 1,015                                   8 1,081                                   10
Finland 1,015                                   8 1,086                                   9
Luxemburg 1,010                                   10 1,047                                   16
Germany 1,007                                   11 1,062                                   11
Holland 1,004                                   12 1,048                                   14
Sweden 997                                      13 1,114                                   5
Canada 995                                      14 1,005                                   21
Greece 995                                      14 1,119                                   4
Hungary 993                                      16 1,059                                   12
Korea 974                                      17 1,034                                   17
Poland 967                                      18 1,021                                   19
Slovakia 962                                      19 1,048                                   15
France 957                                      20 997                                      22
Chec 939                                      21 1,027                                   18
Austria 933                                      22 994                                      23
The U.K. 920                                      23 1,009                                   20
Mean 1,003                                   1,075                                   
Source: KPA Source: Opinet
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4.2.2.3 Analysis of the profit level of the Korean refinery companies        
       Looking into the income statement of the Korean refinery companies also weakens the 
suspicion of excessive profit. The average operating income (OI)/revenue ratio of the four 
refinery companies from 2002 - 2008 was 4.95%, lower than that of 6.5% of the overall 
manufacturing industries in Korea. Considering that the companies are exercising their 
business in the extended area, the profitability of the refinery industry becomes even worse. 
Those companies had expanded their business to the petrochemical and lubricant industry 
and most of their profits are actually coming from the extended sectors. When separating 
just the refinery divisions, the OI/revenue ratio drops to 2.85% (KFTC, 2009b).  
                                                  (unit: KRW Bil.)   
 
Table 14:       The trend of revenue and operating income of Korean refinery industry 
 (KFTC, 2009b) 
The profitability worsened after 2010. In 2011, the total revenue of GSC, one of the 
four companies, was KRW 47 Trillion; KRW 39 Trillion of the profit was from the refinery 
division. However, the refinery division earned only KRW 653 Billion among its operating 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Refining 33,732      32,676      39,922      50,273      57,208      63,604      96,111      
Non-refining 4,962         7,363         10,752      11,587      13,437      15,936      21,818      
Total 38,694      40,038      50,674      61,860      70,644      79,540      117,929    
Refining 552            726            2,193         1,474         899            2,209         2,633         
Non-refining 489            1,187         2,239         2,926         2,041         1,927         1,666         
Total 1,041         1,914         4,432         4,400         2,940         4,136         4,300         
Refining 1.6% 2.2% 5.5% 2.9% 1.6% 3.5% 2.7%
Non-refining 9.9% 16.1% 20.8% 25.2% 15.2% 12.1% 7.6%
Total 2.7% 4.8% 8.7% 7.1% 4.2% 5.2% 3.6%
Revenue
OI
OI/Revenue
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income of KRW 2 trillion. Thus, the refinery division took up 90% of the revenue, but 
earned only 30% of the profit. The division even showed net loss in the following year.                                                  
                                                                                                                      (unit: KRW Bil.) 
 
Table 15: The trend of revenue and operating income of GS Caltex 
One more thing to consider in the profit analysis is that the profitability of the 
domestic refinery market is usually lower than that of the export market because of 
distribution costs. The domestic marketing requires a more complicated distribution process 
than the export transaction, where the refinery completes its role at the loading dock. GSC 
argued that the net selling price of the domestic market was lower than that of the export 
market by KRW 2.5 per liter (GSC, 2012).    
If the refinery products were provided by public sector, the loss must be subsidized 
by tax revenue. However, thanks to private companies’ efforts to survive, the domestic 
supply is subsidized by the companies’ own internal operations. This low profitability is the 
result of effective competition. Even though the current share of the imported goods is 
nearly zero, excessive profit can attract the import at any time. The market share of 
importers increased after liberalization to 3.4% in 2002, but later decreased to below 1% 
(KFTC, 2009b). This fact does not indicate a weakened competition; rather it means that 
2010 2011 2012
Refining 28,505               39,001               39,647               
Non-refining 6,811                 8,945                 7,836                 
Total 35,316               47,946               47,483               
Refining 430                     653                     (509)                   
Non-refining 770                     1,367                 1,020                 
Total 1,200                 2,020                 511                     
Refining 1.5% 1.7% -1.3%
Non-refining 11.3% 15.3% 13.0%
Total 3.4% 4.2% 1.1%
OI/Revenue
Revenue
OI
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the refineries had given up their excessive profits. The Korean government favors  
importers by loosening entry barrier qualification requirements. There are potential 
competitors like petrochemical companies, trading companies, and large consumers like 
logistics companies. If they think the fuel business looks lucrative, they can import and 
supply the petroleum products with very little effort. In fact, Samsung Total Petrochemical 
Corporation, one of the petrochemical companies, launched its gasoline import in 2012 
when the government promoted the competition (Cho, 2012). This openness of the market 
casts a serious threat to the refineries. The refinery plant prefers non-halted operation to 
maximize the economy of scale. Any disruption due to a slump in sales deteriorates the 
efficiency of the plant. Thus, refineries do not want to lose the market share despite a 
temporary loss for smooth plant operation.  
4.2.2.4 Retail market      
Considering this analysis, the possibility that manufacturers are obtaining excessive 
profit seems very low. How about the retail market? As discussed above, the number of gas 
stations in Korea exceeded 13,000 in 2012 and decreased to 12,692 as of August 2013. 
Hana Institute of Finance researcher Kim’s 2013 research proposed the proper number of 
gas stations for the Korean oil market via a comparison by countries. He estimated that the 
number is between a minimum of 7,000 to a maximum of 12,000, which means there are an 
excessive number of gas stations are operating in the market. 
 The average gross margin/revenue ratio of gas stations dropped from 12.7% in 
1995 to 4.5% in 2008. This results in relatively low profitability considering capital expense 
and operating capital; the dropping profitability indicates that the market has become more 
competitive after liberalization (KFTC, 2009b).  
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Table 16: Gross margin/Revenue ratio trend of gas station in Korea from 1995-2005  
(KFTC, 2009b) 
       The trend of OI/Revenue rate shows extremely low profitability of gas stations. A 
Korea Development Institute research presented that the average OI/Revenue rate of 
Korean gas stations was 1.02%, much lower than that of the service industry in Korea 
(KDI, 2012). 
 
 
Table 17: OI/Revenue ratio trend of gas station in Korea (KDI, 2012) 
  2011 research by Kim and Kim noted that a gas station in an urban area of Korea 
had, on average, nine competing stations within a one kilometer radius. Price competition is 
unavoidable given this situation in the retail market. 
         It is clear that there are no excessive profits in the retail market of the Korean oil 
industry. Some gas stations are more profitable than others because of their location, service 
quality, or complementary business, but a lack of profit cannot be interpreted as the 
presence of an unjust market dominating power.   
Many people refuse to retreat from the suspicion of the oligopolistic refinery market 
structure. Thus, the industry has been a good target for the political fight and the populist 
policy. It is not easy for people to avoid the biased inference; however, many studies and 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
12.7 9.2 5.8 8 6.6 5.3 5.5 5.3 4.3 4.5 4.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Gas Station 1.1 0.87 1.12 0.79 1.21 1.02
Service industry 7.13 7.62 3.67 5.23 5.91 5.91
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empirical data show that the refinery industry in Korea is effectively competitive as 
presented above.  
4.3 COMPARISON OF OIL MARKET IN THE CONSIDERATION OF GAS MARKET REFORM  
The linkage between oil and gas is unfamiliar to people. Despite a similarity in basic 
property, the different forms of these fuels, gaseous and liquid, make it hard for people to 
compare them. Thus, few attempts have been made to compare the oil market and gas 
market in the gas market reform debate. Nevertheless, oil and gas are similar in many 
aspects. Both natural gas and oil are hydrocarbon energy sources, though oil has a higher 
energy density and is liquid at the atmospheric condition. Thus the use of the two energy 
fuels derives from their physical character, but their basic use is quite similar. The usage 
can be influenced by technology and infrastructure. In most countries, natural gas is used 
more in residential/commercial sectors and oil is used more in the transportation sector, but 
some countries like Pakistan use natural gas more in transportation. Thus, these two fuels 
are complementary and can be substituted for each other according to technology and 
infrastructure. Under this assumption, this section validates the gas market reform argument 
and show that the opposition to gas market reform can be rejected. Then, this section 
explores the direction of the reform by directly comparing the market structure of these two 
fuels in supply chains by each stage.  
4.3.1 Validation of gas market reform by the comparison of oil and gas 
In most countries, the oil industry implemented a competitive and open market, but 
the gas industry varies in its market structure from a competitive one in the U.S. and the 
U.K. to a monopolized and regulated one in Korea and Taiwan. The trend is obvious 
because European countries are carrying on reforms to convert the market to a competitive 
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one. Korea has an open capitalism economy and also successfully liberalized its petroleum 
industry as discussed above. Then, what is the reason to hesitate liberalizing the gas 
industry? We can reject the argument that the difference between oil and gas leads to a 
different market structure and policy direction, as discussed below. 
First, on the matter of the essential good, oil and gas have no differences regarding 
this issue. If gas is an essential good or a public good, so is oil, since they can be substitutes 
as discussed above. There is no plausible explanation for the assumption that gas is more 
essential than oil. In some degree, oil has more characteristics of an essential good since it 
has lower substitutability especially in the transportation sector, but oil fuels have been 
supplied well under the competitive market structure after its liberalization. Thus, the 
argument that gas is an essential good that should be supplied by the public sector is also 
rejected. 
In terms of unified import function, global market power is tilted toward sellers in 
the global gas market, but this main reason for this purchasing power is alleviated just as 
with the oil market in the past. In the oil industry, OPEC countries once controlled the 
global market, but the imbalance disappeared after the production increase from non OPEC 
countries. A similar thing is happening in the gas market. The change is mainly because of 
diversifying gas supply countries. In the past, the regional separation was rigid such that 
Europe was mainly dependent on Russia or North African countries for its gas supply and 
the Asian region was dependent on the Middle East or Australia. However, they now have 
an alternative in North America after the shale revolution. Diversification will increase in 
the future because the possibility of shale production will expand worldwide due to the 
diffusion of shale production technology such as hydraulic fracture and directional drilling. 
Moreover, economic development and advanced financing methods improved the capital 
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availability of developing countries irrespective of industry. The required capital 
expenditure in LNG infrastructure is no longer an impediment of the project. Korea already 
has many private companies that want to participate in the business. The Korean refinery 
companies have invested $10 Bil in their heavy oil upgrade facilities since 2007 to enhance 
their profitability and survive in the competition (Lee & Yoon, 2012). Those efforts actually 
stabilized the oil supply in the economy. The companies are capable of financing the 
required amount of capital to construct LNG import terminals. As discussed above, the 
purchasing power of KOGAS is an illusion. The diversified gas import will actually 
enhance gas supply stability.     
Regarding the infrastructure investment for universal service, the high dependency 
on pipelines in the domestic distribution is not problematic for Korea anymore. The 
domestic transmission and local distribution pipeline networks are almost completed for 
universal service. Future extension of the network will be a decision about economics and 
efficiency, not universal service. The problem of monopoly disturbing the universal service 
occurs in the bundled operation of pipeline service and gas sales, which can form a 
monopoly and monopsony; that excessive market power can exclude some poor people 
from the universal service within the network. The U.S. regulatory body forced functional 
unbundling since it found that the market dominating power by a natural monopoly occurs 
in the midstream. Thus, the U.S. separated the sales and transportation functions to promote 
a competitive market. Pipeline service companies are treated as a common carrier. U.S. 
regulation also forces non-discriminative and open access to the pipeline (Bosselman, 
Eisen, Rossi, Spence, & Weaver, 2010). Functional unbundling also enabled the steep retail 
market competition in the Korean oil industry. The distribution of oil is diversified because 
the transmission line run by DOPC competes with marine or inland transportation run by 
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each of the refinery companies. However, the presence of DOPC is helpful for the refineries 
to improve their transportation efficiency and effectively helps to unbundle the function.  
Moreover, the final distribution to the end user is not completed by pipeline but by 
gas stations in a very competitive market. Therefore, the Korean oil market illustrates the 
effect of functional unbundling in a competitive market. In the US, local gas sellers buy gas 
from producers and importers in the individual contract or from the local open exchange 
market. They design and propose different rate plans to customers and the customers select 
a plan suitable for their consumption pattern. Switching is very convenient and requires just 
one call. This indicates that gas retail market also can be competitive despite its physical 
constraint–– customers are tied down by pipeline networks.  
In sum, the characteristics of gas and oil are quite identical and the differences are 
adjustable through technology and policy devices to a substantial degree. There is no reason 
for the Korean gas market to deny an application of a competitive market structure despite 
the competitive market of the Korean oil industry. 
4.3.2 The comparison of oil and gas in supply chains 
  Assuming that oil and gas are substantially similar with regard to their traits and 
marketability, a deeper analysis of these two fuels’ supply chains can provide a blueprint 
for the gas market after liberalization. When comparing the respective supply chains of oil 
and gas, a gas importing re-gasification terminal corresponds to a refinery plant with crude 
oil importing docks, gas transmission pipelines correspond to oil transmission networks 
including pipelines, vessels, railroads, and tank trucks with storage depots, and urban gas 
service network corresponds to oil retail channels with gas stations.  
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4.3.2.1 LNG import terminal and oil refining plant 
First, gas importing terminals and refinery plants are the gateways to introducing 
these energy sources into an economy. Moreover, they change the properties of the fuels, 
thus making them marketable. The gas import terminal re-gasifies LNG so that gas can be 
usable and transportable through pipelines; the refinery plant refines crude oil into 
petroleum products like gasoline, diesel, and jet oil, although these process facilities are 
more complex than those of gas re-gasification because of the units used to produce non-
fuel-used by-products like naphtha, lubricant base oil, and coker. A 7.5 mta capacity gas 
importing terminal supplies energy equivalent to about a 180 Mbpd capacity refining plant. 
As previously mentioned, a 7.5 mta capacity gas importing terminal costs around $1 billion 
while the equivalent refining plant costs $4 billon including non-fuel-by-products 
producing facilities. Compared to both a refining plant and an LNG liquefaction plant, the 
capital expense for the LNG regasification terminal is low; the process is much simpler than 
other facilities’ and the main cost driver of LNG import terminal construction is storage 
tanks. Moreover, the site requirement in Korea is less burdensome than in other countries, 
like Japan, because of the low probability of earthquakes. 
As discussed above, the Korean oil industry has more capacity than its domestic 
demand but its surplus capacity is well utilized and creates added value through products 
exports. Moreover, there are 33 additional tank facilities for the product import in the main 
port of Korea, called independent tank terminals. This demonstrates the immediate supply 
and competition in case of an arbitrage opportunity. Meanwhile, the total capacity of gas 
import terminals in Korea is also higher than the total annual domestic gas demands but this 
does not represent a meaningful surplus capacity because of a high TDR. KOGAS’ three 
terminals have relatively large capacities, ranging from 10.5 mta to 26 mta, while the 
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POSCO-owned Gwangyang terminal has only a 1.7 mta capacity. KOGAS seems to have 
pursued an economy of scale but the cost composition of the import terminal is relatively 
low, as shown in Table 3. Moreover, the efficiency of gas supply networks needs to be 
evaluated as a whole, not based on individual terminals’ efficiency. The oil industry utilizes 
an inland storage depot to diversify and improve the supply chain efficiency; the Korean oil 
industry is equipped with 48 storage depots and, from those points, various transportation 
methods can be used (Lee H. , 2013). However, most gas storage tanks are located within or 
near import terminals; as of 2014, Korea has only four terminals and transporting gas from 
these points is almost entirely dependent on pipelines. Thus, gas prices become expensive 
based on the distance from terminals; the expansion of urban gas services to the Gangwon 
and North Gyeongsang areas has been suspended. Now, KOGAS is constructing a new 
importing terminal for those areas, but if small-scale terminal investment had been allowed, 
the service to those areas would have materialized much earlier. For example, Japan has 23 
import terminals with capacities varying from 0.5 mta to 25 mta (Tusiani & Shearer, 2007). 
Even without nationwide pipeline networks, the accessibility rate to urban gas in Japan 
already reached 82.6% in 1998 (Cha, 2001). Thus, the Korean gas industry needs to 
diversify locations and capacities of import terminals. This diversity is hardly obtained 
through the central plan; rather liberalization of the gas industry will achieve diversity much 
sooner through private investments. 
4.3.2.2 Transmission and local distribution of oil and gas 
Transporting oil and gas in the domestic market apparently looks similar because 
both industries use pipelines but their operation is different and the oil industry more often 
uses a variety of transport methods. The pipeline is one of oil’s main transportation 
methods, but it is not as critical as in gas transportation. Since oil is liquid under an 
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atmospheric state, any vessel or vehicle can load petroleum products. Thus, ships, railroad 
carriers, and tank trucks are used in oil transportation. Petroleum products are delivered 
from refining plants or import terminals to storage depots at first and then delivered to gas 
stations mostly by tank trucks. Storage spots are owned by refinery companies, DOPC, 
wholesale agents, or large consumers; gas stations are even more diverse in ownership.  
Thus, there are so many participants in the oil midstream and the transportation cost is only 
about one-fifth of gas transportation’s cost. Though DOPC is the only pipeline company in 
Korea, it is not as influential as KOGAS in the gas industry because DOPC is competing 
with many other types of transportation. For this reason, all of those transporters in the oil 
industry are regarded as common carriers; this aspect is not considered to be a critical 
function in the industry. 
However, the story is different with the gas industry. The transportation methods 
mentioned in oil’s case can be also used in gas transportation but cost matters because gas 
companies need to be equipped with a cryogenic tank or a pressured tank to lessen the 
volume of gas and facilitate delivery. Thus, the pipeline is advantageous in most cases. This 
property places the most importance on the midstream part of the gas industry, and that is 
why pipeline carriers had monopoly and monopsony statuses in the early years in the U.S., 
as explained above. The worse situation in regards to Korea is that a single firm owns the 
monopoly right in importing transmission, although it is controlled by the government. For 
successful liberalization, legally-forced functional unbundling of the transporting function 
from both the importing function and retail function is a key factor to prevent market 
dominance. Therefore, the transmission part of KOGAS needs to be parceled off in the case 
of gas market reform, and the pipeline networks –– including local networks operated by 
LDCs –– should be open to all players without discrimination. (For instance, U.S. Order 
636 presents the key factors in achieving open access of pipeline networks.) The 
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distribution function and sales function should be unbundled. If a company conducts 
business in both parts, the order required an internal “Chinese wall.” All the components in 
the supplying networks, including storage tanks and not just pipelines, should be shared to 
any gas shippers and customers. Moreover, the rates should be calculated with the same 
formula for all users and filed publicly (Bosselman, Eisen, Rossi, Spence, & Weaver, 
2010). 
4.3.2.3 Retail of oil and gas 
 Similar to how KOGAS exercises its function in both importing and transmitting, 
LDCs in Korea are responsible for both local distribution and retail sales of gas. The 
problem is that LDCs are monopolizing the divided areas, even though they are private 
companies. Thus, customers have no choices save for the existing service in their area; they 
have no way to determine if they are getting the best service. Even though LDCs are 
competing with CHP, competition is geographically confined to the urban planned district. 
However, the petroleum product market is extremely competitive. Some gas stations have 
intrinsic competitiveness due to location and are paid higher prices, but customers who do 
not want to buy fuel from those stations have alternative stations within their moving 
boundary. It is not easy for a gas station to price excessively higher than its locational 
advantage or they will have to provide a differentiated service or a promotion in order to be 
in business. As discussed above, the number of gas station in Korea is saturated and, in 
urban areas, one station can have nine competitors in a one kilometer radius.  
However, unlike the oil market where customers have mobility, gas supply facilities 
are static and customers are not free to switch their serving companies. This physical 
constraint is removed by open access to the pipelines in the U.S and the U.K., as previously 
mentioned. Ironically, stringent regulation forcing functional unbundling of the distribution 
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service is a pre-requisite of the deregulation of the retail gas market. Retailers do not 
necessarily possess the supplying hardware to conduct business under this condition. In 
practice, a minimum level of qualification will be required to guarantee unhalted service to 
customers but, conceptually, if a retailer is capable of negotiating supply conditions and 
signing a contract with a wholesaler, it is good to propose service plans to customers. For 
instance, a simple example would be a retailer proposing a proportional rate plan or a 
monthly flat–rate plan. The customer could then compare the plans and choose the plan that 
fits his or her consumption pattern with just a call or online registration. Customers would 
not need to know how gas is coming into their houses. The retailer would pay a tariff to the 
local pipeline operator. To implement the same structure into the Korean gas market, the 
incumbent LDCs need to be split between the pipeline service sector and the gas sales 
sector. Therefore all pipeline networks should open access to them.  
The execution of the above-proposed reform will bring about severe protests from 
the labor unions of KOGAS and LDCs. Furthermore, reformers need to be careful not to 
impinge upon the constitutional private property right, since the LDCs are private 
companies. However, unbundling the pipelines is critical to reform the gas market and 
enables the local gas market to be competitive. There is no reasonable explanation to 
maintain the unfair monopoly status and the competitive oil market in Korea illustrates the 
benefits of this reform.  
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5. Conclusion 
This study examined the validity of reform requests for Korea’s natural gas 
market. Current market structure advocates believe that the system is more efficient 
regarding its universal service of gas as an essential good and the prevention of market 
failures due to a natural monopoly. The current Korean non-competitive market 
monopolized by KOGAS and LDC’s structure has objectives with which to prevent 
productive and allocative inefficiencies; the government regulates prices and 
controls the investment and operation of the industry via KOGAS. Moreover, 
KOGAS’s purchasing power due to the unified gas procurement is a boon for a 
stable and cheap gas supply. However, those arguments are defective because they 
mis-categorize gas. Gas is not an essential good because it has substitutes. The gas 
industry is not a network industry that can cause a natural monopoly. The 
connections of nodes in gas pipeline networks do not constitute a product; the 
network does not require repeated reinvestments. Moreover, purchasing power has 
failed to prove its presence after KOGAS made many mistakes. 
 Proponents of reform also argue that the non-competitive market is 
intrinsically inefficient. Agent theory argues that informational asymmetry between 
principals and agents, i.e. gas companies and consumers or gas companies and the 
government, can incur a moral hazard. Property theory also claims that an SCE is 
less motivated than a private company since they are not a residual claimant. Public 
choice theory also explains that governments and SCEs maximize their own 
interests rather than public interests. 
Despite the failures of previous reform attempts due to the protests from 
invested interest groups like the KOGAS’ and LDCs’ labor union, this debate is 
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ongoing and needs further discussion. This paper provides an empirical benchmark 
to support gas market reform by comparing the situation with the Korean oil 
market. The similarity between the two fuels has been ignored, but they are almost 
identical with regard to properties, usage, and origin. The Korean oil industry 
started from a regulated market and later liberalized to a competitive market. 
Twenty years after its liberalization, the industry is still giving the Korean economy 
a stable and affordable oil supply: refinery capacity is larger than the country’s 
consumption; the private companies have extended their business to related sectors, 
which ended up subsidizing the low profitable domestic petroleum market; The 
Lerner index, a price comparison by countries, the refinery companies’ profits 
analysis, and the number of gas stations all suggest that Korean oil market is 
effectively competitive.  
The gas industry’s effective competitive market can be achieved through 
functional unbundling. Dividing KOGAS into an importing function and 
transmission function and unbundling the local distribution part and marketing part 
of LDCs are key tasks for Korean gas market reform. It is natural that people worry 
about the unexpected consequence from reform. However, failures of the reform 
have usually been due to imperfect, unprepared, or delayed reform rather than 
market failure. The Californian electricity crisis or the soaring gas prices in the 
U.K. after liberalization, common examples of failed reform, were actually not 
genuinely failures of reform but rather were transition costs during the learning 
period. Korea absolutely needs guidance about energy utilization in order to 
overcome the drawbacks from having little energy source; this can be acquired 
through a collective discussion including members of both the public and private 
sectors through a liberalized market. Moreover, successful reform in the energy 
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sector is of utmost importance; the decision should be grounded and not swayed by 
vested interest groups.  
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Acronyms 
AEP American Electric Power 
AKIP Atomic Knowledge Information Portal 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
BMI Business Monitor International 
CH4 Methane 
C2H6 Ethane 
C3H8 Propane 
C4H10 Butane 
C5H12 Pentane 
C16H34 hexadecane 
C3MR Propane (C3) pre-cooled mixed refrigerant (MR) process 
CHP combined heat and power 
CNG compressed natural gas 
CO Carbon monoxide 
CO2 Carbon dioxode 
DOPC Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation 
E&P exploration and production 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
GSC gas supply chain 
GTCC Gas Turbine Combined Cycle 
GTL Gas to liquid 
H2S hydrogen sulfide 
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HD Hyundai Oilbank Co., Ltd 
HG Hositng government 
HOU heavy oil upgrade 
IC SK incheon petrochemical co., LTD 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IOC International oil comany 
JCC Japan crude cocktail 
KDI Korea Development Institute 
KEEI Korea Energy Economics Institute 
KEPCO Korea Electric Power Corporation 
KERI Korea Economic Research Institute 
KFTC Korean Fair Trade Commission 
KIS Korea Investor's service 
kJ/m
2
 Kilo joule per square meter 
KNOC Korea National Oil Corporation 
KOC Korean Oil Corporation 
KOGAS Korea Gas Corporation 
KPA Korea Petroleum Association 
KRW Korean won 
LDC local distribution companies 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
M&A Merger and acquisition 
MKE Korean Ministry of Knowledge and Economics 
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MMbpd million barrels per day 
MMBtu million british thermal unit 
MMtpa million tonnes per annum 
MPR mixed component pre-cooled refrigeration 
MR mixed refrigerant 
NBP National Balancing Point 
NGL natural gas liquids 
NOC national running oil company 
NOX nitrogen oxides  
NTS National Tax service 
NYMEX New York Mercantile Exchange 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
OI operating income 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PCC pure component cascade 
POSCO Pohang Steel Company 
PSC profit sharing contract 
SCE state controlling enterprise 
SO S-oil Corporation 
SOX sulfur oxide 
SPA sales and purchase agreement 
SPL Sabine Pass Liquefaction 
TDR top down ratio 
TOP take or pay 
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TPA tonne per annum 
UK United Kingdom 
UPC utility power companies 
US United States 
USD United states dollar 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WACC weighted average cost of capital 
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